Asymmetric partnerships

Figueroa, Nicolás; Skreta, Vasiliki

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.083

Cited by 12 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…For private values (where η (x) = 0 for all x), this corresponds exactly to the revenue maximizing shares under ex post efficiency obtained by Che (2006) and Figueroa and Skreta (2012). For η (x) = 0, this generalizes the results of those authors to interdependent values.…”

Section: Optimal Ownership Structuresmentioning

confidence: 55%

“…For η (x) = 0, this generalizes the results of those authors to interdependent values. In contrast to the private values case where, as observed by Figueroa and Skreta (2012), all agents have strictly positive shares, the asymmetry in E[η(X i )] under interdependent values may result in an extreme ownership structure where some agents get zero shares.…”

Section: Optimal Ownership Structuresmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…For the case in which all agents draw their types from the same distribution, Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) and Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu (2003) Focusing on private values, Che (2006) and Figueroa and Skreta (2012), with the latter building on the results of Schweizer (2006), extended the analysis to settings where each agent's type is drawn from a different distribution. When distributions can be ranked by stochastic dominance, Che and Figueroa and Skreta show that the ownership structure that maximizes revenue, given an ex post efficient allocation rule, assigns larger shares to stronger agents.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships

Loertscher

Wasser

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study a partnership model with non-identical type distributions and interdependent values. For any convex combination of revenue and social surplus in the objective function, we derive the optimal dissolution mechanism for arbitrary initial ownership and use this mechanism to determine the optimal initial ownership structures. These ownership structures are nontrivial because private information is a transaction cost that makes the model non-Coasian. Equal ownership is always optimal with identical distributions but not with non-identical distributions. When distributions are ranked by stochastic dominance, stronger agents receive higher initial ownership shares when the weight on revenue is small but not necessarily when it is large.

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Section: Optimal Ownership Structuresmentioning

confidence: 55%

Section: Optimal Ownership Structuresmentioning

confidence: 88%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships

Loertscher

Wasser

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…4 With one-dimensional types v ≡ u, a dissolvable partnership exists even if types are not identically (but still independently) distributed (see Schweizer, 2006). Moreover, the ownership structure in a dissolvable partnership matches the expected equilibrium allocation (see Segal and Whinston, 2011), and the marginal types are interior (see Figueroa and Skreta, 2012). See also Yenmez (2012), who extends CGK's results to dissolution of joint ownership of multiple assets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…With

u \equiv v

, Figueroa and Skreta () provide the characterization of dissolvable partnerships based on the location of the marginal types but do not offer such intuition.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Value of the Status Quo and Efficient Partnership Dissolution

Agastya

Birulin

2018

Int Economic Review

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Allowing the value of an asset to depend on the ownership structure, we study ex post efficient (EPEF) dissolution of a partnership in a multidimensional independent private value (IPV) environment. The status‐quo may now be an EPEF outcome. Under mild support restrictions, we show that no partnership can be dissolved. Moreover, when the restrictions fail, one can dissolve a highly skewed partnership but not the equal partnership. These results are in stark contrast to the literature that follows Cramton et al. (Econometrica 55 (1987), 615–32) where an even allocation of initial property rights ensures efficient dissolution.

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Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions

Ensthaler¹,

Giebe

2013

Rev Econ Design

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Asymmetric partnerships

Cited by 12 publications

References 8 publications

Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships

Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships

Value of the Status Quo and Efficient Partnership Dissolution

Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions

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