Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study a partnership model with non-identical type distributions and interdependent values. For any convex combination of revenue and social surplus in the objective function, we derive the optimal dissolution mechanism for arbitrary initial ownership and use this mechanism to determine the optimal initial ownership structures. These ownership structures are nontrivial because private information is a transaction cost that makes the model non-Coasian. Equal ownership is always optimal with identical distributions but not with non-identical distributions. When distributions are ranked by stochastic dominance, stronger agents receive higher initial ownership shares when the weight on revenue is small but not necessarily when it is large.

Partnerships of Bidders with Constant Relative Risk Aversions

“…We have proved that, at the round M − 1, bid function satisfies equation 7. We shall prove that, at the round k < M − 1, bid function satisfies equation 8when the round k + 1 bid function satisfies equation (8).…”

“…e second best mechanism for given initial ownership is described in [7]. In order to maximize the sum of weighted social surplus and income, the optimal dissolution mechanism for arbitrary initial ownership is demonstrated in [8]. In addition, similar to [9], most existing studies have been established under the assumption that bidders are risk neutral or the number of bidders is only two.…”

Coexistence of Centralized and Decentralized Markets

“…Literature on the efficient dissolution of partnerships has important parallels with this study. Starting with Cramton et al (1987) and with contributions by many others (Mylovanov and Tröger, 2014;Kittsteiner, 2003;Fieseler et al, 2003;Loertscher and Wasser, 2019;Figueroa and Skreta, 2012), the setup in this literature includes a divisible good that is owned by many agents and a designer who wants to allocate the whole supply to one agent (or in some cases, to at least reduce the number of owners), thus dissolving the partnership. All of these papers have endogenous roles as buyers and sellers; each agent has some endowment which is less than the total endowment in the economy.…”