Assessing the impact of varying economic conditions on federal reserve behavior

Barth, James R.; Sickles, Robin C.; Wiest, Philip

doi:10.1016/0164-0704(82)90004-0

Cited by 52 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…My methodology differs substantially from that employed in the standard reaction-functioa literature that was surveyed by Barth, Sickles, and West (1982) and Froyen (1974 This article is significantly different from published ernpirical work dealing with optimal Federal Reserve behavior or central bank-objective functions. Taylor (1979) used a small structural model to study optimal monetary policy in the United States.…”

mentioning

confidence: 90%

Revealed Preference of the Federal Reserve: Using Inverse-Control Theory to Interpret the Policy Equation of a Vector Autoregression

Salemi

1995

Journal of Business & Economic Statistics

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confidence: 90%

Revealed Preference of the Federal Reserve: Using Inverse-Control Theory to Interpret the Policy Equation of a Vector Autoregression

Salemi

1995

Journal of Business & Economic Statistics

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“…These signs are consistent with previous monetary policy reaction functions. For a survey, see Barth, Sickles, and Weist (1982). 3.…”

Section: The Variables Included In This Reaction Function Are Similarmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it is customary to include the balance of trade as an objective. See Barth, Sickles, and Weist (1982). 5.…”

Section: The Variables Included In This Reaction Function Are Similarmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monetary policy and presidential elections: A nonpartisan political cycle

Hakes

1988

Public Choice

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This paper develops a Federal Reserve reaction function which relates policy intentions to forecasts of policy objectives. Pre-and postpresidential election estimates of this reaction function for the post-Accord period of 1953-1984 suggest two conclusions:(1) the Federal Reserve reacts differently to economic conditions in the pre-and postelection biennia and (2) these differences in Fed behavior are not likely the result of partisan political influence, but rather the result of self-restraint by the Fed during preelection periods.

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“…However, if one can find such an effect using a single equation, presumably the effect would be even larger if the monetary base were so endogenized. For an analysis of monetary reaction functions, see Abrams, Froyen and Waud (1982), Barth, Sickles, and Wiest (1982), Beck (1983), Bradley (1984), and Levy (1981). Lombra (1984) provides an interesting and more general discussion of the stated-versus-actual behavior of the monetary authority.…”

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confidence: 99%

Do Federal Deficits Really Matter?

Barth¹,

Iden²,

Russek

1984

Contemporary Economic Policy

108

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This paper reviews competing views regarding interest rates and other economic effects of federal deficits. It discusses the findings of several empirical studies that have analyzed these relationships. The main points ofthe paper are that: (a) the con-cept of the deficit is ambiguous because not all deficits have the same economic effects, and (b) by slightly modifying existing studies, one is able to produce empirical evidence showing that deficits or debt do indeed raise interest rates and otherwise affect economic activity in ways consistent with the conven-tional view. Copyright 1984 Western Economic Association International.

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Assessing the impact of varying economic conditions on federal reserve behavior

Cited by 52 publications

References 15 publications

Revealed Preference of the Federal Reserve: Using Inverse-Control Theory to Interpret the Policy Equation of a Vector Autoregression

Revealed Preference of the Federal Reserve: Using Inverse-Control Theory to Interpret the Policy Equation of a Vector Autoregression

Monetary policy and presidential elections: A nonpartisan political cycle

Do Federal Deficits Really Matter?

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