Arms control in cyberspace - architecture for a trust-based implementation framework based on conventional arms control methods

Abstract

This paper explores verification mechanisms, as well as confidence and security building measures, within the scope of existing conventional and strategic arms control regimes. In particular, it analyses the concepts of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Vienna Document as an implementation regime for confidence and security building measures as well as the Open Skies Treaty, representing three major conventional arms control regimes. As an example for strategic arms control, we analyse the Chemical Weapons Convention. The objective of this paper is to identify those means and methods from these successful frameworks that can be adapted and potentially incorporated into a cyber-domain arms control regime. Based on this discussion, the authors suggest a general technical architecture for a trust-based future framework for arms control for cyberspace

Cyberweapons: an emerging global governance architecture

“…Subsequent analyses have tended to default to one of two frames in discussing the regulation of cyberweapons. The first is arms control, in which historical experiences with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons serve as resources for thinking through how arms control mechanisms might be applied to cyberweapons (Brown, 2006;Geers, 2010;Meyer, 2011;Arimatsu, 2012;Maybaum and Tölle, 2016). The second frame concerns the criminalization of cyberweapons (Denning, 2000(Denning, , 2001Prunckun, 2008), drawing on the evolution of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001), discussed in greater detail below.…”

Cyber Peace

“…There are important lessons for cyber peace. While Reagan was speaking in the context of strategic nuclear arms control, many papers have been devoted to the difficulties of arms control in the cyber domain (Maybaum and Tölle, 2016). Cyber weapons do not require the large physical infrastructure of nuclear programs and can far too easily be kept secret to allow for meaningful validation of adherence to arms control commitments.…”