Aristotle on Nonsubstantial Individuals

Abstract

As a first stab, call a property recurrent if it can be possessed by more than one object, and nonrecurrent if it can be possessed by at most one object. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively and ongoing debate among commentators over the last forty-five years. One source of textual evidence in the Categories, drawn on in this debate, is Aristotle's claim that certain properties are inseparable from what they are in.Here the point of contention is whether this commits Aristotle to holding that these properties are inseparable from individuals, since it is commonly held that a property is nonrecurrent, if it is inseparable from an individual. I argue that this evidence is neutral on the question whether there are nonrecurrent properties in Aristotle. One of my aims here is to disentangle the question of recurrence from local issues of individuality and universality in the Categories. But another aim is to turn from the textual considerations, which have dominated the debate, to broader methodological considerations. It is a shared assumption among all those who look to textual evidence from the Categories, so to decide whether Aristotle believes there are nonrecurrent properties, that in this work Aristotle is engaged in a project where the question of recurrence is relevant. I argue that Aristotle's concerns in the Categories are disjoint from the question of recurrence, and so this shared assumption is false.

Aristotle on Predication

“…Since I will not discuss in detail singular terms, I will largely restrict my attention to said of predications. I discuss the present in predicative tie at length in Corkum (2009). 5 Geach (1962) holds that, in the De Interpretatione, Aristotle endorses a fully heterogeneous theory: names and verbs have distinct semantic roles and are not interchangeable.…”

“…If Aristotle's intention is merely to shed light on predication by appeal to certain mereological relationships, then the objection lapses. 18 I broach these issues in Corkum (2013).…”

“…Since I will not discuss in detail singular terms, I will largely restrict my attention to said of predications. I discuss the present in predicative tie at length in Corkum ().…”

Critical notice for Michail Peramatzis'sPriority in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2011

“…A different kind of potentiality is exhibited by a determinable. As I discuss in Corkum 2009, 16 n. 11, the terminology of the determinable-determinate distinction stems from scholastic discussion of the definition of a given species. A genus is the determinable part of the essence or pars determinabilis essentiae and a differentia is a determining part of the essence or pars determinans essentiae .…”

Parts of Universals: An Essay on Aristotle's Categories

“…Ackrill 1963, Robert Heinaman 1981, Daniel Devereux 1992, Michael Wedin 1993, and Verity Harte 2010 Defenders of the view that non-substantial individuals are universals include G.E.L. Owen 1965, Michael Loux 1991, Frank Lewis 1991, Russell Dancy 1975, Mehmet Erginel 2004, and Phil Corkum 2009 J.L. Ackrill's reading of a crucial passage at 1a24-25, faces insuperable difficulties.…”