Aristotle on Predication

Abstract

A predicate logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer; and a sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I will examine evidence for ascribing to Aristotle the view that subjects and predicates refer. If this is correct, then it seems that Aristotle, like the traditional term logician, problematically conflates predication and identity claims. I will argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I will argue that Aristotle's core semantic notion is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution. For example, the predication ‘All men are mortal’ expresses a true thought, in Aristotle's view, just in case the mereological sum of humans is a part of the mereological sum of mortals.

Empty Negations and Existential Import in Aristotle

“…A mereological reading of categorical propositions is suggested in Tweedale (1987), developed by Mignucci (1996) and discussed at length in Corkum (2015). 7 It would suffice for my present purposes to take this reading as a conjecture.…”

“…And it will be useful to sketch this evidence, since the sketch will also flesh out the proposed reading in just a little more detail. The rest of this section draws on the presentation of Corkum (2015).…”

“…In this paper, I will examine Aristotle's general semantic views so to motivate these surprising relationships between predication and existence. In Corkum (2015) I argue that predications have mereological truth conditions for Aristotle: for example, 'Socrates is pale' is true just in case Socrates is a part of the mereological sum of pale things. The existential import of universal affirmations and the semantic profile of predications with empty terms follow from this mereological semantics.…”

Ontological Dependence and Grounding in Aristotle

“…Malink (2009), for example, characterizes aspects of Aristotelian semantics in terms of preorders (irreflexive and transitive relations). And Mignucci (1996) and Corkum (2015) characterize Aristotelian semantics in mereological terms (the part-whole relation is arguably a partial order).…”

La nécessité du mouvement éternel. Note exégétique à Aristote, Physique VIII, 5, 256b8-13

“… 10 Le débat reste ouvert à propos de la théorie de la prédication d'Aristote. Parmi ceux qui suggèrent que la théorie de la vérité du Stagirite implique que le sujet et le prédicat logique ont une référence réelle si l’énoncé qui exprime leur lien prédicatif est vrai, nous signalons Phil Corkum (2015). …”