Argument Quality in Real World Argumentation

Abstract

The idea of resolving dispute through the exchange of arguments and reasons has been central to society for millennia. We exchange arguments as a way of getting at the truth in contexts as diverse as science, the court room, and our everyday lives. In democracies, political decisions should be negotiated through argument, not deception, or even worse, brute force. If argument is to lead to the truth or to good decisions, then some arguments must be better than others and 'argument strength' must have some meaningful connection with truth. Can argument strength be measured in a way that tracks an objective relationship with truth, and not just mere persuasiveness? This article describes recent developments in providing such measures.

Understanding the Role of Linguistic Complexity in Famous Trial Outcomes

“…In most research paradigms, strong, high-quality arguments are classified as those that invoke the most positive elaboration in favor of an attitude and the least negative elaboration opposed to it (see, e.g., Carpenter, 2015;Hoeken et al, 2019;O'Keefe, 2013). As other researchers have long noted, establishing criteria for what makes a quality argument is a complicated task that needs to incorporate normative criteria for argument strength that are independent of invoked elaboration (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1981;Hahn, 2020;Hoeken et al, 2019;O'Keefe, 2013). Further, the relationship between the contents of an argument and the likelihood of processing deeply are complicated (e.g., Liu et al, 2016).…”

When Science Becomes Embroiled in Conflict: Recognizing the Public’s Need for Debate while Combating Conspiracies and Misinformation

“…—Logical fallacies: Patterns of reasoning that are invalid due to their logical structure . Logical fallacies, ranging from “straw man” arguments that misrepresent opponents’ positions to false dichotomies that demand one chooses between one of two options when more options may be available or both choices might be viable (on fallacies more generally, see Hahn 2020).…”

Collectives and Epistemic Rationality

“…Obeying those axioms is a requirement for any agent wishing to be Bayesian (where “being Bayesian” can be defined simply as the assignment of subjective degrees of belief in line with the probability calculus and the use of Bayes' rule for belief revision, see Pettigrew, 2016; but see also Kaye, 1988). Given that Bayesian inference arguably provides the standard of rationality for a broad range of inference problems as exemplified in the widespread use of Bayesian models of judgment (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2007), argumentation (Hahn, 2020), and other aspects of cognition (Chater, Oaksford, Hahn, & Heit, 2010; Chater & Oaksford, 2000; Griffiths, Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008), the fact that the aggregation of probabilities does not fall prey to the impossibility results just discussed is a major boost to rationality.…”