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How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private provision of climate protection, accounting for intrinsic motivation. Findings show that all interventions increase the propensity of individuals to choose the focal value. There is no evidence that recommendations and defaults change average contributions. We report a negative interaction of the default with intrinsic motivation. Expert or political regulator information decreases intervention effectiveness. The study improves our understanding of behavioral public policy instruments.

We explore the common attributes of political conflicts in which scientific findings have a central role, using the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, but also drawing on long-standing conflicts over climate change and vaccinations. We analyze situations in which the systematic spread of disinformation or conspiracy theories undermines public trust in the work of scientists and prevents policy from being informed by the best available evidence. We also examine instances in which public opposition to scientifically grounded policy arises from legitimate value judgments and lived experience. We argue for the public benefit of quick identification of politically motivated science denial, and inoculation of the public against its ill effects.