Are Trade Blocs Building or Stumbling Blocs?

Seghezza, Elena

doi:10.11130/jei.2010.25.2.276

Cited by 38 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…liberalization (Baldwin and Seghezza, 2010;Lawrence, 1992;Wei and Frankel, 1996). A number of these analyses turn on domestic politics (Hoekman and Leidy, 1993;Krishna, 1998;Levy, 1997;McLaren, 2002;Wei and Frankel, 1996).…”

Section: Country Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the political economy of high skilled migration and international trade

Bougheas

Nelson

2013

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We develop a two-country, two-sector model with a continuum of workers to address the link between migration and trade where policy is determined by a simple referendum. In particular, we address two questions. First, are states already in free trade areas more likely to support full integration than states without free trade? Second, is trade liberalization more likely to be supported by a simultaneous referendum on trade and migration than in one on trade alone? The key to our analysis is the recognition that for free trade, migration, or trade and migration to be adopted, the relevant policy must pass the referendum in both countries. We identify conditions under which that occurs. Our model provides an interpretation of the evolution of the politics of economic integration related to NAFTA and European Union. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: F150, F220, F590.

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Section: Country Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the political economy of high skilled migration and international trade

Bougheas

Nelson

2013

European Economic Review

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“…Baldwin and Seghezza () find a negative correlation between MFN tariffs and preference margins in their sample of 23 large countries. They conclude from this that the stumbling block mechanism, if it exists, is not of first order importance.…”

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confidence: 92%

The “Emulator Effect” of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism

Fugazza¹,

Robert‐Nicoud

2014

Rev International Economics

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Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements involving the US. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the US has granted immediate duty free access (IDA) to its Free Trade Area partners across tariff lines. A key finding is that the US has granted IDA status especially on goods for which it had cut the multilateral MFN tariff during the Uruguay round the most. Thus, the Uruguay Round (multilateral) 'concessions' have emulated subsequent (preferential) trade liberalisation. We conclude from this that past liberalisation sows the seeds of future liberalisation and that multilateral and preferential trade agreements are dynamic complements.

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“…However, the literature has not shared a common understanding of the direction of such biases yet. For example, whileLimao (2006) andKaracaovali and Limao (2008) find that the reduction on MFN rates is smaller in the products with the lower FTA preferential rates,Estevadeordal et al (2008) andBaldwin and Seghezza (2010) show the opposite results. 15 Nevertheless, there still remain possible endogeneity sources in our FTA variable, which make our estimates difficult to show the causal effects of FTAs.…”

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confidence: 60%

How Much Do Free Trade Agreements Reduce Impediments to Trade?

Hayakawa¹,

Kimura

2014

Open Econ Rev

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This paper empirically investigates how far free trade agreements (FTAs) successfully lower tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for manufacturing industries by employing the bilateral tariff and NTB data in time series for countries in the world. We find that FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause are associated with the 2.0 and 1.5 % lower tariff rates, respectively. In the case of NTBs, on the other hand, their respective effects are 2.1 and 2.4 %. Also, compared with these effects of FTAs, WTO membership does not have large effects on tariff rates but does have them on NTBs. These results provide important implication for the literature on the numerical assessment of FTAs.

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Are Trade Blocs Building or Stumbling Blocs?

Cited by 38 publications

References 19 publications

On the political economy of high skilled migration and international trade

On the political economy of high skilled migration and international trade

The “Emulator Effect” of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism

How Much Do Free Trade Agreements Reduce Impediments to Trade?

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