Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?

Portmore, Douglas W.

doi:10.1007/s10677-008-9110-1

Cited by 38 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Importantly, ethicists argue that utilitarian reasons of a nonmoral kind can serve as second-order permissions. We may be morally required to promote the welfare of others, but only to the extent that such promotion does not seriously interfere with the pursuit of our own fundamental goals, including those that reflect personal autonomy rather than moral ideals (Portmore, 2008;Raz, 1975).…”

Section: A Qualified View Of Organizational Supererogationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Qualified Account of Supererogation: Toward a Better Conceptualization of Corporate Social Responsibility

2020

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Some firms are initiating pro-stakeholder activities and policies that transcend conventional corporate social responsibility (CSR) conceptions and seem inconsistent with their business interests or economic responsibilities. These initiatives, which are neither legally nor morally obligatory, are responding to calls for a more active role of business in society and for a broader interpretation of CSR. In fact, they benefit stakeholders in a superior and an innovative way and are difficult to reconcile with commonly used rationales in the extant CSR literature, such as win-win opportunities, creating shared value, or corporate philanthropy. For better insight, we develop a qualified account of the concept of supererogation from ethical theory. This account, which examines voluntary responses to moral obligations from which a business is normally excused, is applied to identify the unique features of the initiatives that are not readily understood within conventional reasoning, which is generally focused on a business case.

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Section: A Qualified View Of Organizational Supererogationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Qualified Account of Supererogation: Toward a Better Conceptualization of Corporate Social Responsibility

2020

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“…11 Most notably, Gert (2004). See also Portmore (2007). 12 Obviously, this proposal succeeds only if we've accepted the possibility of deontic valences.…”

Section: Objection: Reasons That Merely Permitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Amorality

Dorsey

2015

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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Actions are usually grouped into one of several moral categories. Familiar ones include the morally required, the morally permitted, and the morally prohibited. These categories have been expanded and/or refined to include the supererogatory and the Bsuberogatory^. Some eschew deontic categories such as the above, but nevertheless allow the existence of two comparative moral categories, i.e., the morally better or morally worse. At the risk of adding to the clutter, I want to explore the possibility of yet a further category, viz., amoral action, or actions that, strictly speaking, lack any moral status whatsoever. I think admitting the existence of amoral actions is not only plausible in its own right, but has consequences for our understanding the nature of moral obligation.

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“…We have argued that the only way to accommodate cases in which a supererogatory action is completely optional, is to reject the claim that moral reasons can play only one sort of role; they must be able to play a nonrequiring role as well. Douglas Portmore 47 and Jamie Dreier 48 have each made proposals for understanding supererogation that employ the idea that moral reasons can do something other than require. Before we conclude, it will be useful to compare the view we have been defending with these related views.…”

Section: Related Views: Dreier and Portmorementioning

confidence: 99%

Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation

Horgan

Timmons

2010

Soc Phil Pol

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In his 1958 seminal paper “Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson argued that the then dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong, ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are “beyond the call of duty” (beyond what is obligatory) and hence actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a controversial category. Some have argued that the concept of supererogation is paradoxical because on one hand, supererogatory actions are (by definition) supposed to be morally good, indeed morally best, actions. But then if they are morally best, why aren't they morally required, contrary to the assumption that they are morally optional? In short: how can an action that is morally best to perform fail to be what one is morally required to do? The source of this alleged paradox has been dubbed the ‘good-ought tie-up’. In our article, we address this alleged paradox by first making a phenomenological case for the reality of instances of genuine supererogatory actions, and then, by reflecting on the relevant phenomenology, explaining why there is no genuine paradox. Our explanation appeals to the idea that moral reasons can play what we call a merit conferring role. The basic idea is that moral reasons that favor supererogatory actions function to confer merit on the actions they favor—they play a merit conferring role—and can do without also requiring the actions in question. Hence, supererogatory actions can be both good and morally meritorious to perform yet still be morally optional. Recognition of a merit conferring role unties the good-ought tie up, and (as we further argue) there are good reasons, independent of helping to resolve the alleged paradox, for recognizing this sort of role that moral reasons may play.

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Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?

Cited by 38 publications

References 20 publications

A Qualified Account of Supererogation: Toward a Better Conceptualization of Corporate Social Responsibility

A Qualified Account of Supererogation: Toward a Better Conceptualization of Corporate Social Responsibility

Amorality

Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation

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