Are All Normative Judgments Desire-Like?

Abstract

In this paper I first argue against one attractive formulation of the motivation argument, and against one attractive formulation of noncognitivism. I do so by example: I suggest that other-regarding normative judgments do not seem to have motivational powers and do not seem to be desires. After defending these two claims, I argue that other views can accommodate the motivational role of normative judgment without facing this objection. For example, desire-as-belief theories do so, since such theories only say that some normative judgments constitute desires, not that all such judgments do so. (I also briefly present similar reasoning in favor of the claim that desire-as-belief is superior to noncognitivism with respect to the Frege-Geach objection.) In short, I argue that, if we are seeking a theory that explains the motivational role of normative judgement, some theories are better than others insofar as they do so without committing to the claim that all normative judgements play such a motivational role.

Why Do Desires Rationalize Actions?

“…If we want to go beyond the standard theory of desire and endorse some theory in the vicinity of the guise of the good, we should not endorse presentationalism. Instead, I suggest that we should endorse desire-as-belief, according to which desires are beliefs rather than appearances of normative properties (Campbell 2018;Gregory 2017a;2017c;Humberstone 1987;Little 1997;McNaughton 1988: 106-117;Price 1989; see also Scanlon 1998: 7-8, 37-49). In what follows I point to some reasons to think that desire-as-belief is preferable to presentationalism as an answer to our central question.…”

“…To fully evaluate desire-as-belief, we might want to investigate other attractive features of the view. For example, perhaps it can explain how moral beliefs can motivate us, without our having to abandon the attractive view that all motivation is explained by desire (for discussion, see Gregory 2017a;McNaughton 1988;Smith 1994;esp. 111-125).…”

Deciding for Others: An Expressivist Theory of Normative Judgment

“…If they're right, accepting one judgment but not the other is a conceptual confusion. But what matters is whether accepting one judgment and not the other, is possible, not whether it is coherent; see Gregory (2017) for discussion. In addition, Gibbard denies Qualitative Supervenience, since he believes one can plan differently for being (say) Jane and for being Mary (Gibbard 2003: 50).…”

“…As noted, Gibbard holds that normative judgments are plans, and in particular that my third‐personal judgment that Mary should leave is a plan for me to leave if I find myself in Mary’s situation. Many have wondered about the psychological plausibility of the view that third‐personal judgments are plans or preferences for remote scenarios (e.g., Cullity 2007, Gregory 2017). Why would we bother forming plans for situations that we know will never arise?…”

“…The third objection is that the Subtle View conflates normative judgments that are distinct, in the sense that it is possible to hold one without holding the other (Gregory 2017). Consider the following two judgments: My judgment that Mary should Φ and my judgment that I should Φ if I am Mary in Mary’s circumstances.…”