2020
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2002.06009
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Approximating Voting Rules from Truncated Ballots

Abstract: Classical voting rules assume that ballots are complete preference orders over candidates. However, when the number of candidates is large enough, it is too costly to ask the voters to rank all candidates. We suggest to fix a rank k, to ask all voters to specify their best k candidates, and then to consider "top-k approximations" of rules, which take only into account the top-k candidates of each ballot. We consider two measures of the quality of the approximation: the probability of selecting the same winner … Show more

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