Approaches to designing the revenue sharing contract under asymmetric cost information

Nosoohi, Iman; Nookabadi, Ali Shahandeh

doi:10.1093/imaman/dpw013

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…(), Yang et al. (), and Nosoohi and Nookabadi (), investigated contract design in the case of cost information asymmetry from the view of an upstream member in a supply chain. The upstream member is often a manufacturer who does not have full information about the cost of a downstream member, for example, a retailer.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…They investigated a promised lead‐time contract between a supplier and the retailer. Recently, Nosoohi and Nookabadi () investigated different approaches to designing the revenue sharing contract with cost information asymmetry. They assumed N different states for a retailer's cost.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In spite of practical importance, modeling of information asymmetry based on N different states has not attained enough attention. Thus, in this study, similar to Lutze and Özer () and Nosoohi and Nookabadi (), we consider N different states for the cost information; however, the option contract and its decision variables in this paper differ from the contracts already studied.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Outsource planning with asymmetric supply cost information through a menu of option contracts

Nosoohi

Nookabadi

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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This paper investigates a supply contract design by a dominant manufacturer who faces a stochastic demand during a selling season. The manufacturer has several estimations of the supplier's cost with corresponding probabilities, that is, asymmetric cost information. The manufacturer designs a menu of call option contracts that include three variables: a supply order, an option, and an exercise price. We determine the optimal negative correlation between option and exercise prices as well as closed-form formulas for the optimal supply orders. The results show that in the optimal menu of contracts either the option or the exercise price may be omitted from the menu, whereas the supply orders should always be customized for each supplier type. We show that in this problem, optimal profit assignment between contract partners under put and bidirectional option contracts is the same as call option contract studied. Numerical analysis including managerial insights is presented.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Outsource planning with asymmetric supply cost information through a menu of option contracts

Nosoohi

Nookabadi

2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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Can a Restaurant Benefit from Joining an Online Take-Out Platform?

Zhang

Huang

2022

Mathematics

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In this paper, we study a restaurant’s take-out model choice and the coordination of an online take-out supply chain. To this end, we first derive the restaurant’s optimal price and/or platform’s commission rate under the restaurant’s three possible take-out models: do not provide online take-out service (NTO model), provide take-out service by joining an online take-out platform (TOF model), or provide online take-out service by itself (TOH model). We investigate the restaurant’s optimal take-out model choice. We then derive the optimal decisions of price and the take-out model under centralization, and study the online take-out supply chain coordination problem. We find that, first, the restaurant may not always benefit from providing online take-out service. It will be beneficial only if the incremental demand generated by take-out service is high. Second, under the centralized supply chain, the TOF model is always better than the TOH model. Meanwhile, when the incremental demand is high, the restaurant should choose the TOF model; otherwise, the NTO model is better. Third, we find that the restaurant’s take-out price and model choice decisions under a decentralized supply chain are both inconsistent with that under the centralized supply chain. Last, we design a sales reward contract which can achieve the price and model choice coordination as well as win-win outcomes for all supply chain members.

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Approaches to designing the revenue sharing contract under asymmetric cost information

Cited by 2 publications

References 29 publications

Outsource planning with asymmetric supply cost information through a menu of option contracts

Outsource planning with asymmetric supply cost information through a menu of option contracts

Can a Restaurant Benefit from Joining an Online Take-Out Platform?

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