Application of Theory of Action to Safety Management: Recasting the NAT/HRT Debate

Abstract

Two influential schools of thought that deal with the management of hazardous technology are Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory. This paper presents another avenue for studying safety management by applying Argyris and SchoÈ n's theory of action. Theory of action provides a detailed explanation for why well-intentioned individuals and organizations often behave ineffectively. When applied to safety, it yields specific insights into why learning and safety performance typically fall short of desired results. This paper presents an overview of this approach and it does so by turning to the debate between the proponents of Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory. Application of theory of action informs both of these dominant schools as it provides specific insights into why safety is often undermined. This approach thereby recasts the debate between these two and argues that they should be seen as complementary, not competing, perspectives.

Knowledge creation and reliable decision‐making in complex emergencies

“…Socialisation of all organisation members to use similar decision premises and assumptions based on timely, extensive and accurate vertical information exchange may open the way to decentralisation of decision-power. Decentralisation could also rely on a principle of subsidiarity, postulating that the ones closest to the event normally have the best knowledge of how to manage it (Schneider, 1995;Bain, 1999;Boin et al, 2005). Minear et al (1992) recommend that coordination take place where the action occurs because people cannot coordinate efficiently in rapidly shifting environments from a distance.…”

Failure to Mobilize in Reliability‐Seeking Organizations: Two Cases from the UK Railway*

“…This has meant that the two approaches have sometimes been put in opposition. But the results of comparing their explanatory power have been inconclusive (Rijpma, 2003), and from a logical standpoint it is something of a false opposition (Bain, 1999; Jarman, 2001). A more productive question is perhaps to ask what occurs somewhere near the margins of what we have taken to be high reliability organizations – to ask what occurs in organizations that do experience catastrophic failure against a background of strong reliability‐seeking.…”

Toward High Reliability Project Organizing in Safety-Critical Projects

“…The evolution of research on high reliability organizing has not been without controversy. Two specific areas of contention remain the on‐going debate between normal accident theory and high reliability theory as explanations of safe performance in safety‐critical organizations (see, for example, Bain, ; Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, ; Rijpma, ; Rosa, ) and the extent to which the characteristics of high reliability organizing can be translated from their original context of highly complex, socio‐technological systems to a broader range of “less exotic” organizations (Creed, Stout, & Roberts, ). Olde Scholtenhuis and Dorée () argue that research on high reliability organizing has been limited by its reductionist focus on absolute reliability and on environments that are safety‐critical in nature, whereas an alternative, more pragmatic perspective would view reliability as relative, of import to all organizations in terms of improved performance and therefore applicable across a far broader range of industries.…”