Application of game theory for a groundwater conflict in Mexico

Raquel, Salazar; Szidarovszky, Ferenc; Coppola, Emery A.; Rojano, A.

doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2006.07.011

Cited by 109 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Adams et al, 1996;Clark, 1980;Hannesson, 1995;Kronbak and Lindroos, 2007;Levhari and Mirman, 1980;Madani, 2010;Munro, 1979;Raquel et al, 2007;Suzuki and Nakayama, 1976;Thoyer et al, 2001;Wang et al, 1988). Few specific cases of forest management have been analyzed by game theoretic models (e.g.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economics of forest carbon storage and the additionality principle

Tahvonen

Rautiainen

2017

Resource and Energy Economics

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economics of forest carbon storage and the additionality principle

Tahvonen

Rautiainen

2017

Resource and Energy Economics

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“…As suggested by Kurek and Ostfeld [32], we used a procedure based on an utopian solution [33] to identify the optimal solution, circled in blue on Figure 9. Therefore, other comparison methods could be employed, such as game theory techniques [34]. The utopian solution has been identified as minimizing the objective functions:…”

Section: Optimal Pareto Set For the Event In March 2011mentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiency Assessment of Existing Pumping/Hydraulic Network Systems to Mitigate Flooding in Low-Lying Coastal Regions under Different Scenarios of Sea Level Rise: The Mazzocchio Area Study Case

Cioffi¹,

Trapella²,

Conticello³

2018

Water

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Abstract:Rising of the sea level and/or heavy rainfall intensification significantly enhance the risk of flooding in low-lying coastal reclamation areas. Therefore, there is a necessity to assess whether channel hydraulic networks and pumping systems are still efficient and reliable in managing risks of flooding in such areas in the future. This study addresses these issues for the pumping system of the Mazzocchio area, which is the most depressed area within the Pontina plain, a large reclamation region in the south of Lazio (Italy). For this area, in order to assess climate change impact, a novel methodological approach is proposed, based on the development of a simulation-optimization model, which combines a multiobjective evolutionary algorithm and a hydraulic model. For assigned extreme rainfall events and sea levels, the model calculates sets of Pareto optimal solutions which are obtained by defining two optimality criteria: (a) to minimize the flooding surface in the considered area; (b) to minimize the pumping power necessary to mitigate the flooding. The application shows that the carrying capacity of the hydraulic network downstream of the pumping system is insufficient to cope with future sea level rise and intensification of rainfall.

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“…Obeidie et al [16] addressed a conflict of exporting water from Canada. Raquel et al [17] developed a cooperative solution concept for balancing the economic benefits versus negative environmental impacts from agriculture production. Wang et al [20] considered a cooperative model for allocation of water among different users in Canada.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision support system analysis with the graph model on non-cooperative generic water resource conflicts

Al-Juaidi

2017

IJET

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This paper aims to resolve four non-cooperative generic water disputes using the Graph Model approach for conflict resolution. Therefore, a Decision Support System (DSS) has been utilized integrating multiple-criteria decision analysis, stability analysis, and uncertainty analysis using the info-gap technique. The DSS has been applied to four different non-cooperative water conflict including: (1) groundwater common pool; (2) environmental problem between two countries; (3) river conflict dispute between two countries; and (4) sustainable development game. The DSS demonstrates four stability concepts, including Nash Stability (R), General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric Metarationality (SMR), Sequential stability (SEQ) to illustrate how results differ with regard to the stability concepts. After classifying the preferences of stakeholders, the DSS recognized the most stable solution, considering the potential actions and counteractions of all stakeholders. Consequently, solution robustness was tested under the uncertainty related to stakeholders' perspective, under non-cooperative attitudes. When there are no sufficient details about the conflict and what decision to be prepared, the DSS proved to be useful in modeling complex disputes, determining most robust solution, and examining the effect of uncertainty.

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Application of game theory for a groundwater conflict in Mexico

Cited by 109 publications

References 10 publications

Economics of forest carbon storage and the additionality principle

Economics of forest carbon storage and the additionality principle

Efficiency Assessment of Existing Pumping/Hydraulic Network Systems to Mitigate Flooding in Low-Lying Coastal Regions under Different Scenarios of Sea Level Rise: The Mazzocchio Area Study Case

Decision support system analysis with the graph model on non-cooperative generic water resource conflicts

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