The terrestrial carbon sink has been large in recent decades, but its size and location remain uncertain. Using forest inventory data and long-term ecosystem carbon studies, we estimate a total forest sink of 2.4 ± 0.4 petagrams of carbon per year (Pg C year(-1)) globally for 1990 to 2007. We also estimate a source of 1.3 ± 0.7 Pg C year(-1) from tropical land-use change, consisting of a gross tropical deforestation emission of 2.9 ± 0.5 Pg C year(-1) partially compensated by a carbon sink in tropical forest regrowth of 1.6 ± 0.5 Pg C year(-1). Together, the fluxes comprise a net global forest sink of 1.1 ± 0.8 Pg C year(-1), with tropical estimates having the largest uncertainties. Our total forest sink estimate is equivalent in magnitude to the terrestrial sink deduced from fossil fuel emissions and land-use change sources minus ocean and atmospheric sinks.

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Like cities, forests grow by spreading out or by growing denser. Both inventories taken steadily by a single nation and other inventories gathered recently from many nations by the United Nations confirm the asynchronous effects of changing area and of density or volume per hectare. United States forests spread little after 1953, while growing density per hectare increased national volume and thus sequestered carbon. The 2010 United Nations appraisal of global forests during the briefer span of two decades after 1990 reveals a similar pattern: A slowing decline of area with growing volume means growing density in 68 nations encompassing 72% of reported global forest land and 68% of reported global carbon mass. To summarize, the nations were placed in 5 regions named for continents. During 1990–2010 national density grew unevenly, but nevertheless grew in all regions. Growing density was responsible for substantially increasing sequestered carbon in the European and North American regions, despite smaller changes in area. Density nudged upward in the African and South American regions as area loss outstripped the loss of carbon. For the Asian region, density grew in the first decade and fell slightly in the second as forest area expanded. The different courses of area and density disqualify area as a proxy for volume and carbon. Applying forestry methods traditionally used to measure timber volumes still offers a necessary route to measuring carbon stocks. With little expansion of forest area, managing for timber growth and density offered a way to increase carbon stocks.

Following the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union obligated itself to lower its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 20% below their 1990 level, by the year 2020. Carbon dioxide is the major GHG. To fulfill this obligation, the nations must meet the sustainability challenge of countering rising population plus affluence with the dematerialization of less energy per GDP plus the decarbonization of less carbon per energy. To test the feasibility of meeting the challenge, we analyzed carbon dioxide emission during 1993-2004. Although emissions in the entire Union grew only by an average of 0.31% per year, emissions and their drivers varied markedly among the 27 member states. Dematerialization and decarbonization did occur, but not enough to offset the slight population growth plus rapidly increasing affluence. To fulfill its obligation in the next 12 years, the EU27 would have to counter its increasing population and affluence by a combined dematerialization and decarbonization 1.9-2.6 times faster than during 1993-2004. Hence, fulfilling its obligation by addressing fossil carbon emissions alone is very unlikely.

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We explore the optimal regulation of forest carbon and albedo for climate change mitigation. We develop a partial equilibrium market-level model with socially optimal carbon and albedo pricing and characterize optimal land allocation and harvests. We numerically assess the policy's market-level impacts on land allocation, harvests, and climate forcing, and evaluate how parameter choices (albedo strength, productivity of forest land, and carbon and albedo prices) affect the outcomes. Carbon pricing alone leads to an overprovision of climate benefits at the expense of food and timber production. Complementing the policy with albedo pricing reduces these welfare losses.

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