2015
DOI: 10.1111/1475-6773.12424
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Apple Pickers or Federal Judges: Strong versus Weak Incentives in Physician Payment

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Cited by 11 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Pure fee-for-service based payments, although highly prevalent, have come under widespread criticism. Decades ago, the well-known Professor of Economics Burton Weisbrod argued: "Payments based on the level of activity are suitable for paying apple pickers, but not physicians" 12 . For several reasons, it makes sense to use strong incentives for apple pickers: It is easy to measure whether they are delivering the desired product, and the cost of measurement is low.…”
Section: A N U S C R I P T C O P Ymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Pure fee-for-service based payments, although highly prevalent, have come under widespread criticism. Decades ago, the well-known Professor of Economics Burton Weisbrod argued: "Payments based on the level of activity are suitable for paying apple pickers, but not physicians" 12 . For several reasons, it makes sense to use strong incentives for apple pickers: It is easy to measure whether they are delivering the desired product, and the cost of measurement is low.…”
Section: A N U S C R I P T C O P Ymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For several reasons, it makes sense to use strong incentives for apple pickers: It is easy to measure whether they are delivering the desired product, and the cost of measurement is low. The product of apple picking is well defined and precise, so there is little concern that rewarding apple picking diverts attention away from other activities that an employer would want apple pickers to carry out 12 .…”
Section: A N U S C R I P T C O P Ymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, caution must be taken in generalizing our results. The influence of performance incentives on value‐based reforms is likely context‐dependent and depends on the exact nature of the incentives (e.g., bonus size, likelihood), programs (e.g., incentivized measures, beneficiary population), and timing (e.g., early versus late adoption; Kronick, Casalino, and Bindman ; Wu et al. ).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, caution must be taken in generalizing our results. The influence of performance incentives on value-based reforms is likely context-dependent and depends on the exact nature of the incentives (e.g., bonus size, likelihood), programs (e.g., incentivized measures, beneficiary population), and timing (e.g., early versus late adoption; Kronick, Casalino, and Bindman 2015;Wu et al 2016). Although we seek to evaluate whether past exposure to incentives can encourage and facilitate participation in Medicare's value-based reforms, these relationships will likely change as the scale and scope of ACOs, Physician Compare, and Meaningful Use evolve and are consolidated into the MIPS and APM payment pathways.…”
Section: Figure 1: Average Marginal Effect Of Financial Incentives Onmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our research agenda attempts to address the “apple picker” analogy proposed by Kronick, Casalino, and Bindman () in the context of payment to physicians , rather than to systems . A substantial literature compares the performance of HMOs and FFS settings (Luft ; Miller and Luft , ).…”
Section: Underlying Assumptions and Focusmentioning
confidence: 99%