Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

Hjortland, Ole Thomassen

doi:10.26686/ajl.v16i7.5913

Cited by 25 publications

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“…Previously I have argued that strength-whatever it means in the context of logical theories-does not straightforwardly count in the favour of the classical theory (Hjortland 2017). I don't want to recount the arguments in detail here, but the gist is that the strength of a logical theory should not be equated with the deductive strength of a consequence relation.…”

Section: Non-evidential Criteriamentioning

confidence: 93%

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What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

Hjortland¹

2019

AJL

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Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the Quinean view that logical theories have no special epistemological status, in particular, they are not self-evident or justified a priori. Instead, logical theories are continuous with scientific theories, and knowledge about logic is as hard-earned as knowledge of physics, economics, and chemistry. Once we reject apriorism about logic, however, we need an alternative account of how logical theories are justified and revised. A number of authors have recently argued that logical theories are justified by abductive argument (e.g. Gillian Russell, Graham Priest, Timothy Williamson). This paper explores one crucial question about the abductive strategy: what counts as evidence for a logical theory? I develop three accounts of evidential confirmation that an anti-exceptionalist can accept: (1) intuitions about validity, (2) the Quine-Williamson account, and (3) indispensability arguments. I argue, against the received view, that none of the evidential sources support classical logic.

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Section: Non-evidential Criteriamentioning

confidence: 93%

“…I have already discussed some of the selection criteria in detail elsewhere (Hjortland 2017). In what follows my aim will be more limited.…”

Section: Abductivism and Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

Hjortland¹

2019

AJL

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“…For an excellent discussion seeHjortland (2017), from which this paper has benefited greatly.6 Here, for terminological reasons, I am eliding the differences between 'reason' and 'logic'. But these are not the same thing and should be kept separate in any complete analysis.…”

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confidence: 99%

On the Role of Logic in Analytic Theology: Exploring the Wider Context of Beall’s Philosophy of Logic

Cotnoir

2019

JAT

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What is the proper role of logic in analytic theology? This question is thrown into sharp relief when a basic logical principle is questioned, as in Beall’s ‘Christ – A Contradiction.’ Analytic philosophers of logic have debated between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism, with the tide shifting towards anti-exceptionalism in recent years. By contrast, analytic theologians have largely been exceptionalists. The aim of this paper is to argue for an anti-exceptionalist view, specifically treating logic as a modelling tool. Along the way I critically engage with Beall on the role of logic in theology, maintaining that theological inquiry is in some ways disanalogous with other theoretical enterprises.

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“…Hjortland (2017) p631 9 It is taken as being uncontroversial thatQuine (1951) is an anti-exceptionalist. As Hjortland notes, Quine is anti-exceptionalism's "most famous proponent".…”

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confidence: 99%

The Adoption Problem and Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

Finn¹

2019

AJL

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Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logic to be, as the name suggests, unexceptional. Rather, in naturalist fashion, the anti-exceptionalist takes logic to be continuous with science, and considers logical theories to be adoptable and revisable accordingly. On the other hand, the Adoption Problem aims to show that there is something special about logic that sets it apart from scientific theories, such that it cannot be adopted in the way the anti-exceptionalist proposes. In this paper I assess the damage the Adoption Problem causes for anti-exceptionalism, and show that it is also problematic for exceptionalist positions too. My diagnosis of why the Adoption Problem affects both positions is that the self-governance of basic logical rules of inference prevents them from being adoptable, regardless of whether logic is exceptional or not.

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Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

Abstract: Introduction to this special issue of The Australasian Journal of Logic

Cited by 25 publications

References 0 publications

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

On the Role of Logic in Analytic Theology: Exploring the Wider Context of Beall’s Philosophy of Logic

The Adoption Problem and Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic

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