Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War

Dueck, Colin

doi:10.1111/j.0360-4918.2004.230_8.x

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…With Soviet Communism perceived as an increasing threat, 18 the linkage often conveyed the need to ensure social welfare and stability as a form of national preparedness in a time of international uncertainty. This was especially true after a rash of international crises in 1948 and 1949 consumed the national agenda, including a Soviet-backed coup in Czechoslovakia, the USSR's development of atomic weapons, and a Communist revolution in China (see Offner 2002;Spalding 2006). While references to America's strength during this period most vividly invoked the force and threat of military might and nuclear weapons, Truman also sought to convey certain domestic commitments as a source of internal strength that sustained the country's foreign policy objectives.…”

Section: "We Must Preserve Our National Strength"mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Historical Presidency: A Strategy of Strength: The Truman Presidency and the Rhetorical Linkage of Warfare and Welfare

Strickler¹

2019

Pres Stud Q

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This article examines the dynamic between the wartime presidency and domestic policy advocacy. The Truman administration developed a strategy to rhetorically link themes and programs of social welfare and national defense, particularly as concerns about the latter emerged on the national agenda. I find that this practice of rhetorical linkage often involved framing Fair Deal objectives as critical to America's national strength. My conclusion is supported by archival evidence from the Truman Library. Rather than merely a rhetorical posture, it is evident that many Fair Deal advocates maintained the idea that a broad social welfare agenda was necessary to uphold American national security objectives.

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Section: "We Must Preserve Our National Strength"mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Historical Presidency: A Strategy of Strength: The Truman Presidency and the Rhetorical Linkage of Warfare and Welfare

Strickler¹

2019

Pres Stud Q

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“…44 Indeed, Franks needed to be philosophical as his time as ambassador was marked by a series of momentous events in Europe and Asia, all of which impacted upon the Anglo-American relationship -the formation of NATO; the end of the Berlin blockade and the establishment of West and East Germany as separate states; the successful testing of a Soviet atom bomb; the Chinese revolution of October 1949 that brought the Communists to power and saw the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan -a development that led to differences between the US and Britain over the latter's recognition of Communist China; the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the subsequent Chinese intervention; growing concern over General MacArthur's conduct of the war and the threat to use atomic weapons that saw Attlee's hurried visit to Washington in December 1950; the controversial dismissal of MacArthur in April 1951; and, last but not least, the rise of McCarthyism, with its unfortunate effect on American domestic politics and diplomacy. 45 Throughout this period Anglo-American relations were aided by the close relationship between Franks and Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State. Acheson was generally sympathetic to Britain as a loyal ally and privately he acknowledged that there was a special bond between the two countries because of their 'common language and history'.…”

Section: Lord Inverchapel -Eccentric Progressive 1946-48mentioning

confidence: 99%

Churchill’s ambassadors – from Fulton to Suez

McCulloch¹

2017

Churchill and the Anglo-American Special Relationship

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One of the many ironies in the history of the Anglo-American 'special relationship', as named by Winston Churchill in his iconic Fulton speech, was that in little more than 18 months after his retirement as Prime Minister in April 1955 the Conservative Government of which he had been the head for almost four years was involved in the disastrous Suez episode-considered by many historians to have been the lowest point in Anglo-American relations from the end of the Second World War down to the present day. The responsibility for this debacle on the British side is usually allocated to Churchill's successor, Anthony Eden, and to a lesser degree his Cabinet, but what of Churchill himself and of Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador to Washington at the time of Suez, appointed by Churchill on the recommendation of Eden? To what extent were Makins and his predecessors successful in establishing the Anglo-American 'special relationship' so desired by Churchill and why did this relationship break down during the Suez crisis? 1 The current essay has three main aims. Firstly, to analyse Churchill's concept of an Anglo-American 'special relationship' as set out in the Fulton speech and the reaction to it in the United States, especially the criticism, put forward by Walter Lippmann amongst others, that British colonialism was a significant constraint upon an openly close relationship with the US. Secondly, to evaluate the political debate within the US on the Fulton speech that continued for several years after it was delivered. The public diplomacy of the British ambassadors who served in Washington in the wake of the Fulton speech forms the bulk of this section. Finally, to examine what has been called 'the descent to Suez', focusing mainly on the period from Churchill's retirement in April 1955, and the extent to which the Suez crisis can be linked to the flaws in Churchill's Fulton vision, notwithstanding the best efforts of Makins and his predecessors to maintain a close Anglo-American relationship. 'The natural term of an Ambassador's mission should be six years', Churchill wrote in 1944, 'unless he is guilty of incompetence or divergence from the Government's policy, when of course he cannot be recalled too soon'. 2 In the light of this statement it is not surprising that of the five ambassadors to the US who held office in the period from Churchill's accession to the premiership in May 1940 to his retirement 15 years later in April 1955 the longest serving was his wartime appointment, Edward Wood, Earl of Halifax (1940-46) who stayed in Washington for over five years and was still there when Churchill delivered his Fulton speech in February 1946. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that his one peacetime appointment as ambassador to Washington, Sir Roger Makins, later 1 st Baron Sherfield, served only three and a half years and was recalled by Eden on the eve of what proved to be the climax of the Suez crisis. Halifax succeeded Philip Kerr, Lord Lothian, appointed by Neville Chamberlain from August 1939 but chief...

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“…30 While recognition of the PRC was unthinkable for the Truman administration, there was an expectation that a PRC military takeover of Taiwan would resolve the issue. 31 Supporters of the Chinese Nationalists in the US Congress condemned the administration's moves to abandon Chiang, and "took every opportunity to challenge Truman's decision", with one senator publicly arguing that abandoning Taiwan was inconsistent with the US commitment to defend Europe from Communist aggression. 32 There was support for denying Taiwan to the PRC within the administration, too, with senior official Dean Rusk recommending that the US "draw the line" in Asia at Taiwan, use its navy and ground force to "neutralise" Taiwan, sponsor a coup to replace Chiang, and seek a UN trusteeship for the island.…”

Section: Taiwan Comes Under Chinese Nationalist Rule 1945-1949mentioning

confidence: 99%

Australian Support for an Independent Taiwan Prior to the Recognition of the People's Republic of China*

Atkinson

2011

Aus J of Politics History

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Australia's efforts between 1950 and 1972 to create an independent Taiwan are an important, largely overlooked element of Australia and Taiwan's international relations. Australia saw de jure independence for Taiwan as a means to support the US while pursuing the interrelated goals of accommodating the People's Republic of China (PRC) and minimising contradictions between US China policy and the policies of the UK and other countries important to it. Initially Australia favoured the establishment of a Taiwanese majority‐controlled state. This preference later gave way to greater support for an independent Republic of China on Taiwan under Chinese Nationalist rule. Australia nevertheless consistently justified its policy via reference to the principle of self‐determination for Taiwan's people — either immediately in the case of a Taiwanese Taiwan, or postponed into the indefinite future in the case of a Chinese Nationalist Taiwan. Championing Taiwan independence lost its utility for Australia when Sino‐ US relations improved in the late‐1960s to early‐1970s, and it became possible for Australia to make the concessions over Taiwan demanded by China without damaging its relationship with the US. This shift preceded the election of a Labor government committed to building a friendly relationship with China. Australia then dropped its policy of advocating Taiwanese independence, and established official relations with China in late 1972.

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Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

The Historical Presidency: A Strategy of Strength: The Truman Presidency and the Rhetorical Linkage of Warfare and Welfare

The Historical Presidency: A Strategy of Strength: The Truman Presidency and the Rhetorical Linkage of Warfare and Welfare

Churchill’s ambassadors – from Fulton to Suez

Australian Support for an Independent Taiwan Prior to the Recognition of the People's Republic of China*

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