Churchill’s ambassadors – from Fulton to Suez

Abstract

One of the many ironies in the history of the Anglo-American 'special relationship', as named by Winston Churchill in his iconic Fulton speech, was that in little more than 18 months after his retirement as Prime Minister in April 1955 the Conservative Government of which he had been the head for almost four years was involved in the disastrous Suez episode-considered by many historians to have been the lowest point in Anglo-American relations from the end of the Second World War down to the present day. The responsibility for this debacle on the British side is usually allocated to Churchill's successor, Anthony Eden, and to a lesser degree his Cabinet, but what of Churchill himself and of Sir Roger Makins, the British ambassador to Washington at the time of Suez, appointed by Churchill on the recommendation of Eden? To what extent were Makins and his predecessors successful in establishing the Anglo-American 'special relationship' so desired by Churchill and why did this relationship break down during the Suez crisis? 1 The current essay has three main aims. Firstly, to analyse Churchill's concept of an Anglo-American 'special relationship' as set out in the Fulton speech and the reaction to it in the United States, especially the criticism, put forward by Walter Lippmann amongst others, that British colonialism was a significant constraint upon an openly close relationship with the US. Secondly, to evaluate the political debate within the US on the Fulton speech that continued for several years after it was delivered. The public diplomacy of the British ambassadors who served in Washington in the wake of the Fulton speech forms the bulk of this section. Finally, to examine what has been called 'the descent to Suez', focusing mainly on the period from Churchill's retirement in April 1955, and the extent to which the Suez crisis can be linked to the flaws in Churchill's Fulton vision, notwithstanding the best efforts of Makins and his predecessors to maintain a close Anglo-American relationship. 'The natural term of an Ambassador's mission should be six years', Churchill wrote in 1944, 'unless he is guilty of incompetence or divergence from the Government's policy, when of course he cannot be recalled too soon'. 2 In the light of this statement it is not surprising that of the five ambassadors to the US who held office in the period from Churchill's accession to the premiership in May 1940 to his retirement 15 years later in April 1955 the longest serving was his wartime appointment, Edward Wood, Earl of Halifax (1940-46) who stayed in Washington for over five years and was still there when Churchill delivered his Fulton speech in February 1946. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that his one peacetime appointment as ambassador to Washington, Sir Roger Makins, later 1 st Baron Sherfield, served only three and a half years and was recalled by Eden on the eve of what proved to be the climax of the Suez crisis. Halifax succeeded Philip Kerr, Lord Lothian, appointed by Neville Chamberlain from August 1939 but chief...