Another Brick in the Wall: Carrier Sanctions and the Privatization of Immigration Control

Rodenhäuser, Tilman

doi:10.1093/ijrl/eeu020

Cited by 26 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Externalisation largely relies on the active cooperation from countries of transit and origin, which are pushed and incentivised to adopt specific legislative and policy measures. However, destination countries also carry out activities in foreign territories directly, for example through visa policies (Bigo & Guild, 2005) or information campaigns (Watkins, 2017), and they outsource controls to private companies acting there, such as carriers (Rodenhäuser, 2014). Similarly, migration‐related activities in countries of transit and origin can be delegated to IOs (Lavenex, 2016; Wunderlich, 2012) and NGOs/CSOs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non‐governmental/civil society organisations and the European Union‐externalisation of migration management in Tunisia and Egypt

Cuttitta

2020

Population Space and Place

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This paper sheds light on the role of non-governmental/civil society organisations, as well as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in the externalisation of migration management in Tunisia and Egypt. These organisations are involved in migration-related activities, which, from the externalisation perspective, should prevent people from attempting the sea-crossing to Europe, thus immobilising them in North Africa. The paper is an ethnographic border regime analysis drawing on extensive fieldwork. It shows that European Union-externalisation is not a univocal and smooth process. Instead, externalisation is entangled in a complex network of actors and dynamics. Measures meant to support externalisation may produce effects contrary to those envisaged, whereas practices accomplishing externalisation goals may be in fact the result of internalisation. By analysing the various actors in their diverse practices and in their-sometimes conflictual-relationships, the paper also tries to minimise state-centrism and Euro-centrism in the study of externalisation.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non‐governmental/civil society organisations and the European Union‐externalisation of migration management in Tunisia and Egypt

Cuttitta

2020

Population Space and Place

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“…My autonomy is not invaded just because the concert I wanted to attend is sold out, the house I wanted to buy is too expensive, or the person I fancy is in love with another. The autonomy of a person is not compromised as soon as any option is foreclosed; it is compromised only when the person is denied an adequate range of options (Raz 1986). The reason my autonomy is not compromised when concert tickets are sold out is that a sufficient range of valuable options are likely to remain available.…”

Section: Two Objections Consideredmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The legitimate authority to decide does not entail the right to coerce. Likewise, the right to use coercion does not entail the legitimate authority to decide (Raz 1986;p. 25;Roughan 2013;p.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Authority and Coercion Beyond the State? The Limited Applicability of Legitimacy Standards for Extraterritorial Border Controls

Beckman

2024

Jus Cogens

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Extraterritorial border controls prevent migrants from arriving at the territory of the state and effectively undermine rights to apply for asylum and protections against non-refoulement. As a result, a wealth of scholarship argues that external border controls are illegitimate exercises of state power. This paper challenges two versions of this argument, first, the claim that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate because they subject migrants to morally impermissible forms of coercion and, second, the claim that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate because they subject migrants to illegitimate claims to authority.Against coercion-based accounts of legitimacy, this paper defends the view that while carrier-sanctions are coercive, the coerciveness of a policy is not relevant to its legitimacy. What is relevant is instead whether the authority claimed by the state is legitimate. Against authority-based accounts, this paper argues that states are unable to claim authority in the relevant sense over migrants that are present in the territories of other states.The paper concludes by suggesting that the charge that carrier-sanctions are illegitimate should shift towards the state that allows carriers to enforce these policies on their territories. No state has the legitimate authority to permit other states to pressure carriers to prevent migrants in need of protection from travelling. The state that introduces carrier-sanction legislation, on the other hand, is not exercising illegitimate authority though they may act contrary to demands of justice.

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“…He terms this the “refugee regime complex,” or the increasing overlap between the refugee regime and a “range of other regimes within which States engage in a form of institutionalized cooperation that have a direct and indirect impact on refugee protection” (12). The mechanisms of policy layering include measures such as imposing carrier sanctions on companies that transport foreigners without required documentation to the borders of a state and other “remote control” security measures (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011; Hansen, 2014; Rodenhäuser, 2014; Zaiotti, 2016).…”

Section: Locating Existing Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transforming refugees into migrants: institutional change and the politics of international protection

Mourad

Norman

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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Since the 2015 refugee “crisis,” much has been made of the distinction between the legal category of refugee and migrant. While migration scholars have accounted for the increased blurring of these two categories through explanations of institutional drift and policy layering, we argue that the intentional policies utilized by states and international organizations to minimize legal avenues for refugees to seek protection should also be considered. We identify four practices of policy “conversion” that have also led to the increasingly problematic distinction between migrants and refugees: (1) limiting access to territory through burden-shifting and other practices of extraterritorialization; (2) limiting access to asylum and local integration through procedural and administrative hindrances; (3) the use of group-based criteria as a basis of exclusion; (4) the inclusion of non-Convention criteria within resettlement schemes. Drawing upon a historical institutionalist approach and a wide array of empirical sources—including 3 years of combined primary field research conducted in Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey between 2013 and 2016—we demonstrate that states are actively pursuing a greater degree of control over the selection of refugees, in practice making refugee resettlement closer to another immigration track rather than a unique status that compels state responsibility.

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Another Brick in the Wall: Carrier Sanctions and the Privatization of Immigration Control

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

Non‐governmental/civil society organisations and the European Union‐externalisation of migration management in Tunisia and Egypt

Non‐governmental/civil society organisations and the European Union‐externalisation of migration management in Tunisia and Egypt

Authority and Coercion Beyond the State? The Limited Applicability of Legitimacy Standards for Extraterritorial Border Controls

Transforming refugees into migrants: institutional change and the politics of international protection

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