Anonymity And Verifiability In Multiattribute Reverse Auction

Srinath, T. R.; Singh, M. P.; Pais, Alwyn Roshan

doi:10.5121/ijitcs.2011.1401

Cited by 6 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The comparisons of the computation time of these protocols are shown in Figures , , and . Because did not provide strong privacy and public verifiability, the computation time of is much less than and the proposal. Because the proposal adopts hash function in place of public key, the computation time of proposal is much less than in the opening phase and the winner determination phase.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because did not provide strong privacy and public verifiability, the computation time of is much less than and the proposal. Because the proposal adopts hash function in place of public key, the computation time of proposal is much less than in the opening phase and the winner determination phase. According to Figures , , and , it is observed that the proposals computation time is reasonable and less than .…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Later, Srinath et aladopts Paillier cryptosystem and range protocol from Parkes et al's protocol to achieve bid privacy and public verifiability. However, bid privacy is still weak privacy; bids are revealed to auctioneer at the end of the auction [22,23]. The winner determination model of those secure multiattribute auction protocols is based on the assumption that the bids can be transferred into quantified values through quantitative linear scoring function.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…/ only valuates independent attribute; it cannot handle interdependent relation among attributes. Srinath et al and Parkes et al [21][22][23] adopt Homomorphic properties of Paillier cryptosystem, transfer secure computation problem into numerical comparison under 3740 W. SHI the protection of Homomorphic encryption finally, and solve secure computation for qualitativeindependent-attribute-based bid structure. So, the problem is how to solve secure computation for qualitative-interdependent-attribute-based bid structure?…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A provable secure sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction scheme under semi‐honest model

Shi

2013

Int J Communication

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SUMMARYSecure electronic auction protocol attracts increasing attention in the field of information security research. A variety of secure electronic auction protocols have achieved a lot. However, those studies mainly focus on price‐based auction model. There are few literatures involving security issues of multi‐attribute e‐auction. In recent years, the existing literatures mainly focus on the winner determination problem of multi‐attribute auction, but research of multi‐attribute e‐auction just begin from the perspective of information security. The proposal intends to start with the multi‐attribute e‐auction protocol, explores the different results in the multi‐attribute auction model because of different bid structures, focuses on qualitative attribute‐based winner determination auction model, proposes a new qualitative attribute‐based sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction scheme under semi‐honest model for the first time. According to the security analysis and computation comparison, it provides strong bid privacy, public verifiability, and reasonable computational cost. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

A provable secure sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction scheme under semi‐honest model

Shi

2013

Int J Communication

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“…During the last two decades, auction mechanisms are studied and analyzed in different literatures . In spite of satisfying various security requirements, for example, privacy , anonymity , correctness, and verifiability , coercing and bid‐rigging are two serious attacks on sealed‐bid auction. Coercer is an adversary who is powerful enough to inflict the other bidders to bid low prices so that she could win the auction by bidding unreasonably low bid.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sealed‐bid auction: a cryptographic solution to bid‐rigging attack in the collusive environment

Howlader

Mal

2015

Security Comm Networks

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Sealed‐Bid auction is an efficient and rational way to establish the price and trading goods in the open market. However sealed‐bid auctions are subject to bid‐rigging attack. Receipt‐free mechanisms are proposed to prevent bid‐rigging. So far, all the proposed receipt‐free mechanisms are based on strict assumptions: i) The channel between bidders and the auction authorities (like auctioneer, sealer, registering authority etc.) must be untappable, 2) the authorities are assumed to be honest (not colluded), hence ensure privacy and anonymity of bids. Moreover, the existing receipt‐free mechanisms are bandwidth intensive (estimated difference between the minimum and maximum bidding price). In this paper, we present a receipt‐free sealed‐bid auction mechanism which can withstand public channel and colluded authorities. The proposed mechanism can work even under the situation where all the authorities except one are colluded. Unlike the existing mechanisms, the computational complexity of the proposed mechanism is independent of the bandwidth and only depends on the number of valid bids. The auction mechanism requires O(mlogm) computational steps to resolve the winner, where m is the number of valid bids in the system. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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A sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction protocol with strong bid privacy and bidder privacy

Shi

2013

Security Comm Networks

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In this paper, a sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction protocol that mainly focuses on security issues (i.e., bid privacy, bidder anonymity, and fairness problem) is presented. In recent years, existing literatures mainly focus on the multi‐attribute winner determination problem and other issues, but research of multi‐attribute e‐auction just begin from the perspective of information security. The new proposal is motivated by the conflict between bidder anonymity and denial‐of‐service attack from an insider. It utilizes private set intersection method to solve the privacy problem of winner determination of sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction. The proposed sealed‐bid auction scheme preserves the strong privacy of the bids and provides verifiable correctness. According to the security analysis, it satisfies the security requirements of an e‐auction. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Anonymity And Verifiability In Multiattribute Reverse Auction

Abstract: ABSTRACT

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

A provable secure sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction scheme under semi‐honest model

A provable secure sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction scheme under semi‐honest model

Sealed‐bid auction: a cryptographic solution to bid‐rigging attack in the collusive environment

A sealed‐bid multi‐attribute auction protocol with strong bid privacy and bidder privacy

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