Analyzing Linked Systems of Negotiations

Abstract

This article presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the structure and dynamics of what the authors call linked systems of negotiations. Even such seemingO~ straighforward transactions as the purchase of a family car tend to involve linked negotiations. The framework highlights the importance of internegotiation processes in shaping Zones of PossibleAgreement, and proposes a typology of linkage. By mapping out and "reengineering'" linked systems, negotiators can enhance their ability to shape the structure within which their negotiations take place.

Competitively-Linked and Non-Competitively-Linked Negotiations: Bilateral Trade Policy Negotiations in Australia, Singapore and the United States

“…By applying the four-part linkage typology (competitive, reciprocal, synergistic, and antagonistic) developed by Watkins and Passow (1996) to the negotiations in this paper, we can conclude that these negotiations are not linked to each other in a competitive manner (one negotiation did not preclude the other) or in a reciprocal manner (failure to achieve agreement in one had no impact on the other). Pertinent data demonstrate some synergistic links (enhancing opportunities for parties) and antagonistic links (diminishing opportunities for parties).…”

“…A related and more complex concept found in international relations is Putnam's (1988) concept of the two-level game or the linked relationship between international diplomacy and domestic politics, although earlier studies by Walton and McKersie (1965), Rosenau (1969), andDruckman (1977) established the theoretical groundwork for this common type of linked negotiation. Watkins and Passow (1996) have developed the most coherent theory of negotiation linkage to date by identifying four types of possible links in negotiation regardless of setting: competitive links (agreement in one negotiation precludes agreement in other linked negotiations), reciprocal links (agreement must be reached in all linked negotiations for overall agreement to be possible), synergistic links (that enhance negotiators' opportunities to make mutual beneficial trades and/or reach an agreement), and antagonistic links (that diminish negotiators' opportunities to make mutual beneficial trades and/or reach an agreement). Watkins and Passow offer groundbreaking insight, although this framework is not comprehensive as it does not take into consideration linkages that are fundamentally non-competitive in nature.…”

“…Wagner (1972) introduced the concept of the "link-pin party" and "linked parties" in the communication literature, and Watkins and Passow (1996) first applied this concept to negotiation linkage theory. As can be observed in Figure 1, Australia and the United States were linked parties via their separate negotiations with Singapore, while Singapore served as the link-pin party for these two negotiations.…”

“…This is unfortunate, as only rarely are negotiations not linked to at least one other negotiation. Moreover, links between negotiations have been found to influence directly key elements of negotiation practice such as development and utilization of negotiator power and the application of strategy (Sebenius 1996;Watkins and Passow 1996). Negotiation researchers are normally vigilant when power and strategy are involved.…”

Building Momentum in Negotiations: Time‐Related Costs and Action‐Forcing Events

“…Often negotiations are connected to other negotiations in a larger linked system (for a discussion see Watkins and Passow [1996]). When negotiations are linked, events in one set of negotiations can act to force action in linked sets.…”