Analysis of the compound differential evolution game of new energy manufacturers’ two-stage market behavior under the weight of consumption responsibility

Li, Wanying; Dong, Fugui; Ji, Zhengsen; Xia, Meijuan

doi:10.1016/j.energy.2022.126299

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…Yuan and Zheng (2022) applied evolutionary game theory to construct a three-party evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, and consumers, studying the strategic choices of the these entities during low-carbon technology innovation and investigating equilibrium point stability [18]. Moreover, Li et al (2023) examined the micro-market behavior of new energy generation companies within the context of renewable energy consumption responsibility weighting policies. Their research introduced a dual-market bidding model and a two-stage composite difference evolutionary game algorithm to address complex multi-party game scenarios [19].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, Li et al (2023) examined the micro-market behavior of new energy generation companies within the context of renewable energy consumption responsibility weighting policies. Their research introduced a dual-market bidding model and a two-stage composite difference evolutionary game algorithm to address complex multi-party game scenarios [19]. Liu et al (2023) studied the equilibrium states, evolutionary trajectories, and critical conditions of government and coal-fired power generation companies adopting carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) technology, employing evolutionary game theory and numerical analysis [20].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The evolution of multiagent low-carbon transition has received significant attention, and scholars have conducted extensive discussions and analyses, resulting in many valuable research findings. Among them, most studies adopt the evolutionary game theory approach by constructing evolutionary game models to study the evolutionary paths and patterns of decision-making by the agents [15][16][17][18][19][20]. Evolutionary game theory, as a dynamic theory of the evolution of collective characteristics based on individual learning and selection in the interaction process, has become an essential tool for studying the agents' decision-making evolution mechanisms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Low-carbon energy transition multi-agent network evolutionary under carbon trading scheme

Wei,

Wang,

Fang

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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Transitioning to low-carbon energy is key for reaching carbon neutrality and modernizing our energy systems, but it presents significant cost-related challenges for energy businesses. To foster optimal outcomes, this paper develops a game model including power generators, high-energy businesses, and consumers in the carbon trading framework. The model explores how different entities evolve their low-carbon strategies under social learning influence to optimize utility. Stability analysis of strategy and simulation experiments reveal the following findings: (1) Greater carbon quotas reduce power generators’ low-carbon transition willingness while high-energy-consuming enterprises and consumers remain unchanged. (2) Higher prices for low-carbon products offered by high-energy-consuming enterprises boost low-carbon transition motivation across all parties. (3) Increased green premiums enhance revenue for all parties but are constrained by policy and carbon pricing. (4) Both direct and indirect increases in carbon emissions negatively impact the revenue and utility for all stakeholders. (5) Increasing social learning effect fosters a shift towards low-carbon strategies, accelerating the attainment of game equilibrium, and enhancing market stability and sustainability. This research provides decision support for carbon trading policy design and low-carbon transition of energy enterprises.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Low-carbon energy transition multi-agent network evolutionary under carbon trading scheme

Wei,

Wang,

Fang

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

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“…At present, the main parties responsible for the weight of consumption in China include the grid, distribution/sales companies, and independent power consumers (Liu et al 2020 ). Considering the influence of the WCR, scholars have analyzed the transactional behavior of market subjects (Li et al 2023 ). Zhao and Zhou ( 2021 ) simulated the evolution of electricity producer behavior based on a subjective game model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulation study on the development decision of new energy manufacturers under the weight of consumption responsibility

Dong

2023

Environ Sci Pollut Res

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In 2019, China proposed the weight of consumption responsibility (WCR) policy for renewable energy. This study first analyzes the interaction between the electricity market and the green certificate market and establishes a two-market equilibrium model with multiple subjects. Secondly, a system dynamics model of the development decision of the new energy manufacturers (NEMs) under the interaction of the two markets is established. Finally, taking Henan province as an example, the development trend of NEMs is simulated, and sensitivity analysis is conducted to explore the key influencing factors for the development of NEMs. The results show that the electricity market and the green certificate market interact with each other mainly through the price of electricity and the price of green certificates, thus evolving the trading behavior of trading subjects. By 2035, for every 0.25% increase in non-hydropower WCR in Henan province, the annual added new energy installation will be around 1200 MW. In the current scenario, the policy of certificate multiplier will be detrimental to the overall development of NEMs, and a conservative investment strategy and accelerated technology improvements are more beneficial to NEMs. Carbon emission peaking and carbon neutrality policies can also accelerate the growth of new energy installations.

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A bi-level dispatch optimization of multi-microgrid considering green electricity consumption willingness under renewable portfolio standard policy

Wang,

Hua,

Shi

et al. 2024

Applied Energy

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Analysis of the compound differential evolution game of new energy manufacturers’ two-stage market behavior under the weight of consumption responsibility

Cited by 5 publications

References 38 publications

Low-carbon energy transition multi-agent network evolutionary under carbon trading scheme

Low-carbon energy transition multi-agent network evolutionary under carbon trading scheme

Simulation study on the development decision of new energy manufacturers under the weight of consumption responsibility

A bi-level dispatch optimization of multi-microgrid considering green electricity consumption willingness under renewable portfolio standard policy

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