Analysis of Stable Prices in Non-Decreasing Sponsored Search Auction

Tsung, Chen-Kun; Ho, Hann‐Jang; Lee, SingLing

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34889-1_8

Cited by 3 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…If no bid is updated, the MIP value is reduced to a half and increased by one otherwise. According to the simulation results in [3], AIMD performs better than fixed-MIP in terms of SEP's revenue because the MIP value is adjusted dynamically in response to the bid variation. So the MIP adjusting strategy will vary the convergent bid profile.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…For example, the SEP prefers higher payments, but advertisers do not satisfy this outcome. Building the mechanism to optimize one participant's single objective is not hard [14,8,12,3,7,8]. However, SEP's utility may conflict with the benefit of advertisers, and how to derive the outcome satisfied by both SEP and advertisers is a new challenge.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…To study the benefit conflict for the SEP and advertisers, we consider an English auction-like mechanism: the nondecreasing sponsored search auction (NDSSA) [3]. The major advantage of focusing on the NDSSA is that most people are easy to understand how the NDSSA works.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [3], fixed-MIP and AIMD are proposed as the MIP adjusting strategies to determine the MIP value. The MIP value in each round is identical to the initial MIP value throughout the auction in the fixed-MIP.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When a keyword query is submitted, some advertisements are chosen to be candidates. For the multi-round criterion [8,3,12], issuing a keyword query is treated as a round. After submitting the bid, each candidate is ranked according to his/her bid value, and this ordering principle is called as the rank-by-bid.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sponsored search auction without bias

Tsung

Lee

2012

Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Conference on Electronic Commerce

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In this paper, we focus on finding out the parameter setting of the non-decreasing sponsored search auction (NDSSA) such that the produced outcome is satisfied by both the search engine provider (SEP) and advertisers. Six satisfaction factors are included in our problem formulation. The outcome satisfactions of the SEP and advertisers are modeled as the multi-objective optimization problem based on the satisfaction factors. The weighted versions of L2-norm, cosine similarity, and Euclidean distance are proposed to solve the multi-objective problem. We observe the outcome without bias for both participants in our simulation. Both cosine similarity and Euclidean distance show that SEP and advertisers prefer fixed-MIP to AIMD. Moreover, the initial MIP value should be set as small enough such that each advertiser has at least one opportunity to update his/her bid price.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Influence of Vindictive Bidders in Non-decreasing Sponsored Search Auction

Tsung

Ho²,

Lee³

et al. 2012

2012 International Symposium on Computer, Consumer and Control

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Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions

Tsung

Lee

2013

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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To realize the specific results in the sponsored search auctions, most advertisers submit particular bid prices. The bidding behaviors with specific purposes are called as the strategic bidding. However, some strategic bidding behaviors will result in negative effects, such as the elimination of the equilibrium and the payment increase for some advertisers. The bidding behaviors with negative results are termed as the vindictive bidding. We survey four strategic bidding behaviors which include a rational bidding and three vindictive bidding strategies. In this paper, we study the relationship between the effects resulted by the vindictive bidding and the valuations of the vindictive advertisers. In our experiments, the search engine provider (SEP) is benefited by all vindictive bidding behaviors, and the increment of the SEP's revenue is proportional to the degree of the vindictiveness. Bidding vindictively without sacrificing the own utility improves the advertiser's utility with high probability. Moreover, we observe that the SEP's revenue is improved by the following situations. First, the vindictive advertiser with low valuation in the keywords with high market value results in more SEP's revenue than that in the keywords with low market value. The second case is to raise the bidding competition between advertisers.

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Analysis of Stable Prices in Non-Decreasing Sponsored Search Auction

Cited by 3 publications

References 9 publications

Sponsored search auction without bias

Sponsored search auction without bias

The Influence of Vindictive Bidders in Non-decreasing Sponsored Search Auction

Strategic Bidding Behaviors in Nondecreasing Sponsored Search Auctions

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