Analysis of a commitment period reserve at national and global levels

Missfeldt, Fanny

doi:10.1016/s1469-3062(02)00006-2

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…A country would, if possible, maximize its payoff by undertaking no abatement and selling all its assigned permits. To prevent countries from such behaviour, we recommend a commitment-period reserve as in Kyoto, or a similar mechanism, preventing countries from overselling permits (see Missfeldt and Haites 2002).…”

Section: Determining Deposit Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime

et al. 2012

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Previous research has found that Kyoto's compliance enforcement system provides only weak incentives for compliance, and has proposed alternative compliance enforcement systems for a post-Kyoto climate agreement. This article considers problems with Kyoto's compliance enforcement system and with proposed alternative systems, and contributes to the existing literature by outlining for a new climate treaty a compliance enforcement system that is simple, flexible, potent, and credible. The main idea is that each country must deposit a significant sum of money at ratification, and make additional yearly deposits during the preparation stage prior to the commitment period. When the commitment period ends, countries meeting or beating their emissions limitation target will receive a full refund, whereas countries failing to meet their target will forfeit part or all of their deposit. Provided each country's deposit is no less than its abatement costs, this system will effectively deter noncompliance. Numerical illustrations of the required deposits for selected countries are offered.

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Section: Determining Deposit Sizementioning

confidence: 99%

A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime

et al. 2012

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“…According to Missfeldt and Haites (2002), elimination of non-compliance due to overselling requires that the 100% and 90% specifications of CPR must be increased to 105% and 100%, respectively. The reason is, among other things, that there will be a time lag between emissions and publication of reviewed emissions inventories.…”

Section: The Effects Of Non-compliancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, the time lag should be three years instead of two. The consequence is that Missfeldt and Haites (2002) probably underestimate the parties' potential for overselling in cases where emissions are increasing during the commitment period. 15 Downs et al (1996) show that the deeper the level of international cooperation, the stronger the need for enforcement.…”

Section: 14mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For this purpose, we have applied background data from Haites and Missfeldt (2004) and Missfeldt and Haites (2002), who provide an emissions scenario for Japan (as well as for other Annex B countries).…”

Section: Numerical Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Accords commit Japan to maintain a CPR of 90 percent of its AA, as during the whole commitment period Japan's AA is smaller than five times Japan's most recent inventory, according to the scenario in Haites and Missfeldt (2004) and Missfeldt and Haites (2002). Consequently, Japan could sell 10 percent of its AA, or 553 million AAUs.…”

Section: Numerical Examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cap-and-trade or carbon taxes? The feasibility of enforcement and the effects of non-compliance

Hovi

Holtsmark

2006

Int Environ Agreements

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Abstract:One of the proposed alternatives to Kyoto's cap-and-trade approach is a regime based on an internationally harmonized carbon tax. In this paper, we consider and compare the enforcement problems associated with a tax regime and a cap-and-trade regime, respectively. The paper tries to convey two main points. First, both types of regime require an effective enforcement mechanism. However, such a mechanism is unlikely to be adopted as part of a regime with full participation, because the political process leading up to its adoption tends to water down the enforcement mechanism to a point where it no longer has much bite. And even if this is somehow avoided, countries expecting compliance to be difficult or costly will almost certainly decline to sign -not to mention ratify -the resulting agreement. Second, the implications of non-compliance in a tax regime differ in important ways from the corresponding implications in a cap-and-trade regime. In a cap-andtrade regime emissions trading can make inaction legitimate for buyers of emission permits. In particular, overselling of permits by one (or a few) permit exporting countries might completely undermine the regime's environmental effect. In a tax regime, by contrast, one country's noncompliance can not make inaction by other countries legitimate. It follows that an agreement based on a harmonized carbon tax will always have some effect, provided that at least one country complies.

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Liquidity implications of a commitment period reserve at national and global levels

Haites

Missfeldt

2004

Energy Economics

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Analysis of a commitment period reserve at national and global levels

Cited by 6 publications

References 3 publications

A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime

A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime

Cap-and-trade or carbon taxes? The feasibility of enforcement and the effects of non-compliance

Liquidity implications of a commitment period reserve at national and global levels

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