A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime

Abstract

Previous research has found that Kyoto's compliance enforcement system provides only weak incentives for compliance, and has proposed alternative compliance enforcement systems for a post-Kyoto climate agreement. This article considers problems with Kyoto's compliance enforcement system and with proposed alternative systems, and contributes to the existing literature by outlining for a new climate treaty a compliance enforcement system that is simple, flexible, potent, and credible. The main idea is that each country must deposit a significant sum of money at ratification, and make additional yearly deposits during the preparation stage prior to the commitment period. When the commitment period ends, countries meeting or beating their emissions limitation target will receive a full refund, whereas countries failing to meet their target will forfeit part or all of their deposit. Provided each country's deposit is no less than its abatement costs, this system will effectively deter noncompliance. Numerical illustrations of the required deposits for selected countries are offered.

Muddling through with climate change targets: a multi-level governance perspective on the transport sector

“…See Hovi et al (2012) for further discussion of the challenges of designing target enforcement systems.…”

Enforcing compliance with international environmental agreements using a deposit-refund system

“…Shortly after, Gerber and Wichardt (2009) developed a general theoretical model in the public economics literature, finding that under certain conditions a deposit-refund can motivate efficient public-good provision. More recently, Hovi et al (2012) discuss broadly how such a mechanism can be used to maintain compliance with a climate agreement, and Cherry and McEvoy (2013) designed a series of experiments to test the predictions from Gerber and Wichardt. We add to this particular segment of the literature in two fundamental ways.…”

Håndhevelse og legitimitet: En integrativ vurdering av Parisavtalens effektivitet

“…Siden forhandlingene og signeringen av Kyotoprotokollen i 1997 har sentrale deler av litteraturen på klimaavtaler tatt håndhevelsesskolen rammeverk og forklaringslogikk som utgangspunkt, og deretter forsøkt å finne svar på hvilke mekanismer som kan vaere plausible og effektive for å sikre nødvendig ambisjon, deltakelse og etterlevelse (se for eksempel Aakre, Helland & Hovi 2014;Barrett 1999;Hovi et al 2012;Hovi, Skodvin & Aakre 2013;Mitchell 1994;Skodvin & Hovi 2015). Blant annet på grunn av en observert mangel på slike håndhevelsesmekanismer har denne litteraturen uttrykt pessimisme når det gjelder effektivitetsutsiktene til både FNs klimaforhandlinger generelt, og Parisavtalen spesielt (se Bang, Hovi & Skodvin 2016;Hovi, Skodvin & Aakre 2013;Skodvin & Hovi 2015).…”

“…Håndhevelsesskolen har vektlagt at hvis en klimaavtale skal vaere både dyp og bred burde helst et effektivt sanksjonssystem sikre etterlevelse av avtalen (se for eksempel Hovi et al 2012). Dette impliserer vanligvis en slags «ovenfra-ned»-tilnaerming.…”