2004
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00345.x
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An Invalid Argument for Contextualism

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Cited by 13 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…In short: The knowledge account of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertibility yields contextualism about knowledge. (2002: 187) While I will ultimately agree with DeRose that treating knowledge as a norm of assertion leads to contextualism, I think DeRose's argument is invalid as stated (as pointed out in Blackson 2004). From the fact that the standards for warranted assertibility are not constant, contextualism does not yet follow.…”
Section: Contextualism Vindicated: Derose and Blacksonmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…In short: The knowledge account of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertibility yields contextualism about knowledge. (2002: 187) While I will ultimately agree with DeRose that treating knowledge as a norm of assertion leads to contextualism, I think DeRose's argument is invalid as stated (as pointed out in Blackson 2004). From the fact that the standards for warranted assertibility are not constant, contextualism does not yet follow.…”
Section: Contextualism Vindicated: Derose and Blacksonmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…My response thus differs fundamentally from Blackson's response. Blackson (2004) responds that DeRose's argument (what I represent above as 1-3) is invalid because it ignores possible versions of invariantism, especially what is known in the literature variously as "sensitive moderate invariantism" (Hawthorne 2004, chap. 4), "interest-relative invariantism" (Stanley 2005, chap.…”
Section: Thomasmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…The act of saying something meaningful in a language is a linguistic act. Blackson (2004) argues that it is invalid for a different reason; see note 7 for more detail.…”
Section: Speech Acts and Companymentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Deriving the Moore‐paradoxical (10) I said that the contextualist would have to accept (7), namely that S has hands. If one is a contextualist about knowledge and if one holds a knowledge account of assertion, then it is very plausible—as Keith DeRose 2002, sec.2 has pointed out for the reverse argument—to also hold a contextualist account of assertibility (see also Blackson 2004 and DeRose 2004). How does this apply here?…”
Section: How To Avoid Moore‐paradoxality?mentioning
confidence: 99%