An Invalid Argument for Contextualism

Blackson, Thomas A.

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00345.x

Cited by 13 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…In short: The knowledge account of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertibility yields contextualism about knowledge. (2002: 187) While I will ultimately agree with DeRose that treating knowledge as a norm of assertion leads to contextualism, I think DeRose's argument is invalid as stated (as pointed out in Blackson 2004). From the fact that the standards for warranted assertibility are not constant, contextualism does not yet follow.…”

Section: Contextualism Vindicated: Derose and Blacksonmentioning

confidence: 87%

Knowledge in the Image of Assertion

Schaffer¹

2008

Philosophical Issues

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How must knowledge be formed, if made in the image of assertion? That is, given that knowledge plays the normative role of governing what one may assert, what can be inferred about the structure of the knowledge relation from this role? I will argue that what one may assert is sensitive to the question under discussion, and conclude that what one knows must be relative to a question. In short, knowledge in the image of assertion is question-relative knowledge.

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Section: Contextualism Vindicated: Derose and Blacksonmentioning

confidence: 87%

Knowledge in the Image of Assertion

Schaffer¹

2008

Philosophical Issues

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“…My response thus differs fundamentally from Blackson's response. Blackson (2004) responds that DeRose's argument (what I represent above as 1-3) is invalid because it ignores possible versions of invariantism, especially what is known in the literature variously as "sensitive moderate invariantism" (Hawthorne 2004, chap. 4), "interest-relative invariantism" (Stanley 2005, chap.…”

Section: Thomasmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…The act of saying something meaningful in a language is a linguistic act. Blackson (2004) argues that it is invalid for a different reason; see note 7 for more detail.…”

Section: Speech Acts and Companymentioning

confidence: 97%

Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism

Turri¹

2010

The Philosophical Review

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This essay shows how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy.The essay's plan: Section 1 explains contextualism and invariantism. Section 2 recounts a common influential objection to contextualism, to wit, that its proponents confuse warranted assertability with truth. Section 3 reviews DeRose's response to this objection, wherein he argues that contextualism's opponent, in leveling this objection, is hoist with his own petard. Sections 4-6 develop resources for crafting a version of invariantism that escapes DeRose's argument. Section 7 introduces us to this freshly equipped version of invariantism, which can be wedded to the knowledge account of assertion. Sections 8-11 entertain and respond to objections. Section 12 concludes our discussion by suggesting how our new invariantist could respond to the radical skeptic, in a way that rivals the antiskeptical contextualist's response. for very helpful conversation, feedback, and advice. Thanks also to two anonymous referees.

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“…Deriving the Moore‐paradoxical (10) I said that the contextualist would have to accept (7), namely that S has hands. If one is a contextualist about knowledge and if one holds a knowledge account of assertion, then it is very plausible—as Keith DeRose 2002, sec.2 has pointed out for the reverse argument—to also hold a contextualist account of assertibility (see also Blackson 2004 and DeRose 2004). How does this apply here?…”

Section: How To Avoid Moore‐paradoxality?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Contextualism and the Factivity Problem

Baumann

2008

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Epistemological contextualism ‐ the claim that the truth‐value of knowledge‐attributions can vary with the context of the attributor ‐ has recently faced a whole series of objections. The most serious one, however, has not been discussed much so far: the factivity objection. In this paper, I explain what the objection is and present three different versions of the objection. I then show that there is a good way out for the contextualist. However, in order to solve the problem the contextualist has to accept a relationalist version of contextualism.

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An Invalid Argument for Contextualism

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Knowledge in the Image of Assertion

Knowledge in the Image of Assertion

Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism

Contextualism and the Factivity Problem

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