2015 IEEE 18th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems 2015
DOI: 10.1109/itsc.2015.65
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An Intersection Game-Theory-Based Traffic Control Algorithm in a Connected Vehicle Environment

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Cited by 101 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…The weight in (2) is chosen as w = [1000, 500, 5, 100, 50, 1] . The discount factor in the cumulative reward function is λ = 0.8, and the update step size in the adaptation law (7) is β = 0.6. We first test the AV controller's performance versus opponent vehicles controlled by type-1 or 2 drivers.…”
Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The weight in (2) is chosen as w = [1000, 500, 5, 100, 50, 1] . The discount factor in the cumulative reward function is λ = 0.8, and the update step size in the adaptation law (7) is β = 0.6. We first test the AV controller's performance versus opponent vehicles controlled by type-1 or 2 drivers.…”
Section: Simulation Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With the use of the above three neural networks, we move the computations to solve the optimization problems (4), (5), and (6) from online to offline. The online control is policybased and requires only neural network evaluations, where the policy adapts to the opponent vehicle's driver by the adaptation law (7). The overall structure of the AV controller is shown in Fig 2.…”
Section: B Explicit Online Implementationmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…. , k 4 result from the derivation of (8) and (10) with respect to x (see (16)), respectively, and depend on v Vn,x (t f ) and u Vn,x for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The optimal control input can be deduced from…”
Section: Appendixmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This approach leads to relatively complex algorithms to compute the intersection allocation and requires a payment system. In [3], the authors have proposed a chicken-game [4] inspired intersection control. The proposed game includes two players, where the players aim to minimize their delay while also avoiding any collision; and the intersection manager controls their actions, i.e., swerve or not, to achieve a Nash equilibrium [5] of the game.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%