An Internet Voting System Supporting User Privacy

Kiayias, Aggelos; Korman, Matias; Walluck, David

doi:10.1109/acsac.2006.12

Cited by 39 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(16 reference statements)

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“…Helios, culminates a long line of previous schemes that employ homomorphic type of voting, cf. [18,23,33] and utilizes the Benaloh challenge [5] as the fundamental mechanism to attain verifiability. Helios by design requires the voter to utilize a voter supporting device to prepare a ciphertext and after an indeterminate number of trials, the voter will cast the produced ciphertext.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

End-to-End Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model

Kiayias

Zacharias

Zhang

2015

Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2015

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123

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We present the cryptographic implementation of "DEMOS", a new e-voting system that is endto-end verifiable in the standard model, i.e., without any additional "setup" assumption or access to a random oracle (RO). Previously known end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems required such additional assumptions (specifically, either the existence of a "randomness beacon" or were only shown secure in the RO model). In order to analyze our scheme, we also provide a modeling of endto-end verifiability as well as privacy and receipt-freeness that encompasses previous definitions in the form of two concise attack games.Our scheme satisfies end-to-end verifiability information theoretically in the standard model and privacy/receipt-freeness under a computational assumption (subexponential Decisional Diffie Helman). In our construction, we utilize a number of techniques used for the first time in the context of e-voting schemes that include utilizing randomness from bit-fixing sources, zero-knowledge proofs with imperfect verifier randomness and complexity leveraging.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

End-to-End Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model

Kiayias

Zacharias

Zhang

2015

Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2015

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123

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“…Blind-signature-based primitives were introduced by Fujioka et al [19], are used in [8] and [19] and adopted in Sensus [14]. Further protocols are provided in [26], who also provide examples for some other approaches that are not based on any of the above primitives.…”

Section: B Voting System Design Primitives Protocols and Attack Coumentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Reference [26] identifies three general design approaches for building evoting systems based on three primitives. Mixnet-based primitives, introduced by Chaum [10], are part of the protocols of [24] and [39] and are used in the e-voting system SureVote [9].…”

Section: B Voting System Design Primitives Protocols and Attack Coumentioning

confidence: 99%

Security in Large-Scale Internet Elections: A Retrospective Analysis of Elections in Estonia, The Netherlands, and Switzerland

Schryen

Rich

2009

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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Remote voting through the Internet provides convenience and access to the electorate. At the same time, the security concerns facing any distributed application are magnified when the task is so crucial to democratic society. In addition, some of the electoral process loses transparency when it is encapsulated in information technology. In this paper, we examine the public record of three recent elections that used Internet voting. Our specific goal is to identify any potential flaws that security experts would recognize, but may have not been identified in the rush to implement technology. To do this, we present a multiple exploratory case study, looking at elections conducted between 2006 and 2007 in Estonia, Netherlands, and Switzerland. These elections were selected as particularly interesting and accessible, and each presents its own technical and security challenges. The electoral environment, technical design and process for each election are described, including reconstruction of details which are implied but not specified within the source material.We found that all three elections warrant significant concern about voter security, verifiability, and transparency. Usability, our fourth area of focus, seems to have been well-addressed in these elections. While our analysis is based on public documents and previously published reports, and therefore lacking access to any confidential materials held by electoral officials, this comparative analysis provides interesting insight and consistent questions across all these cases.Effective review of Internet voting requires an aggressive stance towards identifying potential security and operational flaws, and we encourage the use of third party reviews with critical technology skills during design, programming, and voting to reduce the changes of failure or fraud that would undermine public confidence.

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“…The resulting voting protocols can be roughly categorized into three main categories accordingly to the vote anonymization technique used: mix-nets (Chaum, 1981;Juels et al, 2005;Furukawa et al, 2010), blind signatures (Chaum, 1988;Ohkubo et al, 1999;Joaquim et al, 2003) and homomorphic voting systems (Cohen and Fischer, 1985;Cramer et al, 1997;Juels et al, 2005;Kiayias et al, 2006). Usually vote protocols assume a "cryptographic capable" voter, however the incapacity of a common voter to perform cryptographic operations means that the voter must trust the vote client machine to perform the voter's side cryptography, e.g.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…the (in) security of the vote casting PC that can be the home or office computer of even a computer at a cybercafé or at a public library (Jefferson et al, 2004;Kiayias et al, 2006;Dagstuhl Accord, 2007). Usually, Internet voting systems require trust on the vote client platform (the vote casting PC ) to give some guarantees of voter's privacy and election's integrity; however, this is not easily achievable given that vote casting PCs are in uncontrolled environments and often vulnerable to a number of attacks (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%