An international multilevel competition policy system

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper develops a proposal for an international multilevel competition policy system, which draws on the insights of the analysis of multilevel systems of institutions. In doing so, it targets to contribute bridging a gap in the current world economic order, i.e. the lack of supranational governance of private international restrictions to market competition. Such governance can effectively be designed against the background of a combination of the well-known nondiscrimination principle and a lead jurisdiction model. Put very briefly, competition policy on the global level restricts itself to the selection and appointment of appropriate lead jurisdictions for concrete cross-border antitrust cases, while the substantive treatment remains within the competence of the existing national and regional antitrust regimes.

The Economics of International Competition Policy: New Challenges in the Light of Digitization?

“…However, these fundamental benefits of a system with decentralized elements do not imply that the same case must be exposed to multiple procedures and conflicting decisions. Instead, sophisticated lead-jurisdiction models offer scope for combining welfare benefits of competition policy coordination with welfare gains from mutual institutional learning and diversity (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004;Budzinski 2008aBudzinski , 2009Budzinski , 2018.…”

“…Still, while the ICN approach is definitely superior to an uncoordinated approach, scientific insight from economics favor an enhanced integration of competition policy regimes vis-á-vis the increasing international and intercontinental character of competition. Concepts for reducing the (welfare) costs of multiple and conflicting proceedings and decisions as well as for closing loopholes without jeopardizing a beneficial diversity and openness have been proposed (Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004;Budzinski 2008aBudzinski , 2009Budzinski , 2018. However, it remains unclear whether a window of opportunity to move towards such scenarios will emerge during the ICN's third decade and whether the ICN, in such a case, can play the role of a facilitator towards more enhanced and more binding forms of cooperation.…”

International Antitrust Institutions

“…With a view to the four economic problems of international antitrust (as derived in section 2), it represents an interesting step to combine these two concepts towards a multilevel lead jurisdiction model (Budzinski 2009(Budzinski , 2011. The advantage of adding the vertical multilevel dimension to the lead jurisdiction concept lies in the option to introduce a referee authority, monitoring and supervising the impartiality of the assigned lead jurisdictions and providing conflict resolution if necessary.…”