Lead Jurisdiction Concepts: Prospects and Limits for Rationalizing International Competition Policy Enforcement

Abstract

Lead jurisdiction models represent one option how to extend and enhance contemporary interagency cooperation among competition policy regimes. They constitute a multilateral, case-related form of cooperation that is suited to effectively create a one-stop-shop for the prosecution of international cartels, the handling of cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the governance of international antitrust cases. Thus, lead jurisdiction models offer considerable economic benefits. However, they also entail several caveats. Three possible working problems and downside effects of lead jurisdiction models in international competition policy enforcement are discussed in this paper.

The Economics of International Competition Policy: New Challenges in the Light of Digitization?

“…However, these fundamental benefits of a system with decentralized elements do not imply that the same case must be exposed to multiple procedures and conflicting decisions. Instead, sophisticated lead-jurisdiction models offer scope for combining welfare benefits of competition policy coordination with welfare gains from mutual institutional learning and diversity (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004;Budzinski 2008aBudzinski , 2009Budzinski , 2018.…”

“…Still, while the ICN approach is definitely superior to an uncoordinated approach, scientific insight from economics favor an enhanced integration of competition policy regimes vis-á-vis the increasing international and intercontinental character of competition. Concepts for reducing the (welfare) costs of multiple and conflicting proceedings and decisions as well as for closing loopholes without jeopardizing a beneficial diversity and openness have been proposed (Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004;Budzinski 2008aBudzinski , 2009Budzinski , 2018. However, it remains unclear whether a window of opportunity to move towards such scenarios will emerge during the ICN's third decade and whether the ICN, in such a case, can play the role of a facilitator towards more enhanced and more binding forms of cooperation.…”