An incentive approach to land set-aside programs

Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Jayet, Pierre-Alain; Picard, Pierre

doi:10.1016/0014-2921(95)00016-7

Cited by 39 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…These rents are payments above the minimum payment necessary to induce landowner participation in the PES program. Hidden information has been the subject of theoretical analyses in the context of agri-environmental payment schemes, which have much in common with PES schemes (Spulber, 1988;Chambers 1992;Bourgeon et al 1995;Fraser 1995;Wu and Babcock 1996;Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997;Moxey et al 1999;Ozanne et al 2001;Peterson and Boisvert 2004).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services

Ferraro

2008

Ecological Economics

455

271

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In contractual relationships involving payments for environmental services, conservation buyers know less than landowners know about the costs of contractual compliance. Such asymmetric information reduces the effectiveness of payment schemes and increases the expense to implement them. To reduce these negative effects, conservation agents can take three approaches: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions. Although current theory and empirical work provides practitioners with some insights into the relative merits of each approach, more theoretical work and experimentation in the field is necessary before definitive conclusions can be drawn.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services

Ferraro

2008

Ecological Economics

455

271

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“…The nonnegativity of the weights in (3) is a typical assumption in the literature, see Bourgeon et al (1995) and Martimort (1996). Bourgeon et al (1995) define a 1 as the public preferences for producers. Likewise, we coin the term public preferences for environmental quality to define a 2 .…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Second-best pollution taxes: revisited and revised

Kampas

Horan

2015

Environ Econ Policy Stud

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This paper examines second-best pollution taxation within a unified framework, which simultaneously takes into account society's preferences towards producer profits and environmental costs, the possibility of raising public revenue through pollution taxes and the costly administration of pollution taxes. Several new results were derived concerning the discrepancy between second-best taxes and the Pigouvian rule. In addition, this paper shows that previous results identified in the relevant literature are special cases of our results. It should be stressed, however, that the comparison between first-best and second-best taxation is an empirical issue. Finally, the policy implications of the results are also discussed.

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“…Principal-agent models in the case of asymmetric information have also been developed in the context of agrienvironmental policy (Bourgeon et al 1995;Wu and Babcock 1995;Moxey et al 1999;Ozanne et al 2001;Fraser 2002Fraser , 2004Gren 2004;Hart and Latacz-Lohmann 2005;among others). However, these studies generally involve either moral hazard or adverse selection separately.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%