An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

Güth, Werner; Schmittberger, Rolf; Schwarze, Bernd

doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7

Cited by 3,922 publications

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“…The ultimatum game is among the most widely used experimental paradigms on bargaining in humans (Güth et al, 1982;Güth and Kocher, 2014) and, more recently, in nonhuman primates (Jensen et al, 2007;Proctor et al, 2013). It involves two players deciding how to split a given monetary endowment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testosterone administration does not affect men's rejections of low ultimatum game offers or aggressive mood

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Roberts

Spencer

et al. 2017

Hormones and Behavior

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Correlative evidence suggests that testosterone promotes dominance and aggression. However, causal evidence is scarce and offers mixed results. To investigate this relationship, we administered testosterone for 48h to 41 healthy young adult men in a within-subjects, double-blind placebo-controlled balanced crossover design. Subjects played the role of responders in an ultimatum game, where rejecting a low offer is costly, but serves to destroy the proposer's profit. Such action can hence be interpreted as non-physical aggression in response to social provocation. In addition, subjects completed a self-assessed mood questionnaire. As expected, self-reported aggressiveness was a key predictor of ultimatum game rejections. However, while testosterone affected subjective ratings of feeling energetic and interested, our evidence strongly suggests that testosterone had no effect on ultimatum game rejections or on aggressive mood. Our findings illustrate the importance of using causal interventions to assess correlative evidence.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Testosterone administration does not affect men's rejections of low ultimatum game offers or aggressive mood

Cueva

Roberts

Spencer

et al. 2017

Hormones and Behavior

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show abstract

“…(9) predicts which mutants will be able to invade that mutualism. In addition, if it is assumed that players have to guess their surpluses before sharing with their partner, then their guessing error might explain supercooperation, a hitherto enigmatic experimental phenomenon (Appendix C; Guth et al, 1982;Forsythe et al, 1994;Nowak, 2006). …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If participants in sharing games think they are in wealthy times, they might donate therefore relatively large portions of wealth to build up favors for meagre times. This could be the basis of experimentally observed supercooperation (Guth et al, 1982;Forsythe et al, 1994;Nowak, 2006 (called E i ,) a response due to other genes (I i ), and a response due to an individual stochastic factor p i (j , which is related to player number j. Let's assume that all p i (j are independently drawn from the same distribution, and that all components, except D i and E i , are independent.…”

Section: Appendix C Correlation Between Sharer Fluctuations In Largementioning

confidence: 99%

Bet hedging based cooperation can limit kin selection and form a basis for mutualism

Uitdehaag¹

2011

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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International audienceMutualism is a mechanism of cooperation in which partners that differ help each other. As such, mutualism opposes mechanisms of kin selection and tag-based selection (for example the green beard mechanism), which are based on giving exclusive help to partners who are related or carry the same tag. In contrast to kin selection, which is a basis for parochialism and intergroup warfare, mutualism can therefore be regarded as a mechanism that drives peaceful coexistence between different groups and individuals. Here the competition between mutualism and kin (tag) selection is studied. In a model where kin selection and tag-based selection are dominant, mutualism is promoted by introducing environmental fluctuations. These cause reduction in reproductive success by the mechanism of variance discount. The best strategy to counter variance discount is to share with agents who experience the most anticorrelated fluctuations, a strategy called bet hedging. In this way, bet hedging stimulates cooperation with the most unrelated partners, which is a basis for mutualism. Analytic results and simulations reveal that, if this effect is large enough, mutualistic strategies can dominate kin selective strategies. In addition, mutants of these mutualistic strategies that experience fluctuations that are more anticorrelated to their partner, can outcompete wild type, which can lead to the evolution of specialization. In this way, the evolutionary success of mutualistic strategies can be explained by bet hedging-based cooperation

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“…In both decision situations participants have to choose between self-interested and socially desirable behaviors (Forsythe et al, 1994;Güth et al, 1982). Observed behavior provides an estimate of distributive norms because "fair" and profitmaximizing strategies diverge.…”

Section: Experimental Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using crowdsourced online experiments to study context-dependency of behavior

Keuschnigg

Bader

Bracher

2016

Social Science Research

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We use Mechanical Turk's diverse participant pool to conduct online bargaining games in India and the US. First, we assess internal validity of crowdsourced experimentation through variation of stakes ($0, $1, $4, and $10) in the Ultimatum and Dictator Game. For cross-country equivalence we adjust the stakes following differences in purchasing power. Our marginal totals correspond closely to laboratory findings. Monetary incentives induce more selfish behavior but, in line with most laboratory findings, the particular size of a positive stake appears irrelevant. Second, by transporting a homogeneous decision situation into various living conditions crowdsourced experimentation permits identification of context effects on elicited behavior. We explore contextdependency using session-level variation in participants' geographical location, regional affluence, and local social capital. Across "virtual pools" behavior varies in the range of stake effects. We argue that quasi-experimental variation of the characteristics people bring to the experimental situation is the key potential of crowdsourced online designs.

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An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

Cited by 3,922 publications

References 8 publications

Testosterone administration does not affect men's rejections of low ultimatum game offers or aggressive mood

Testosterone administration does not affect men's rejections of low ultimatum game offers or aggressive mood

Bet hedging based cooperation can limit kin selection and form a basis for mutualism

Using crowdsourced online experiments to study context-dependency of behavior

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