“…A review of the GATT0WTO's history suggests three possible explanations+ First, the GATT0 WTO required developing countries to extend MFN tariffs to other participants, 45+ Gowa and Kim conclude differently, arguing that the GATT, "had a large, positive, and significant impact on trade between only five of its member states: Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the United States"; see Gowa and Kim 2005, 454+ Subramanian and Wei forthcoming agree with our finding that, contra Rose, the GATT0WTO promoted world trade+ They claim, however, that most of the benefits went to the developed world and not to developing nations+ We suspect the difference in findings stems from our use of different data and a corrected measure of standing in the GATT0WTO+ Notes: All estimates in the table come from a pooled ordinary least squares~OLS! regression with separate GATT coefficients for each negotiating round+ The unit of observation is the directed dyad and the dependent variable is the natural log of imports~measured in 1967 U+S+ dollars!+ The regression involved 381,656 observations, which covered fifty-nine years and 17,359 directed dyads+ The model includes fixed effects for directed dyads and years, as well as controls for reciprocal PTAs, nonreciprocal PTAs, GSP, currency union, colonial orbit, and the log product of real GDP+ Robust standard errors, clustered by directed dyad, appear in parentheses+ The standard error of the regression was +94, and R 2 was +84+ many of whom were previously subject to higher rates+ Through the simple application of this principle, the GATT0WTO broadened the geographic coverage of trade+ Second, through negotiations, the organization encouraged developing countries to lower and bind their tariffs+ In some cases this occurred because developed countries acted on behalf of their colonies; in other cases, developing countries participated directly in the negotiating rounds+ Finally, the GATT0WTO gave developing countries access to markets of other participants, including ones that liberalized their trade policies considerably+ Thus, even when countries only partially followed the rule of the regime, all members benefited, making the GATT0WTO more than an elite "country club+" 46 A similar logic helps explain our finding that the GATT0WTO had a positive effect even when only one member of the dyad participated in the organization+ The final column of Table 4 shows that, in all but the most recent time period, dyads with one GATT0WTO participant traded more than dyads without any participants+ We see no evidence of trade diversion, even in the early years of limited membership+ The positive effect when only one country participates may be due to MFN agreements that predate the GATT0WTO+ The United States, for example, maintained MFN treaties with many trading partners at the time of the GATT's creation+ As a consequence, U+S+ concessions in the GATT0WTO were extended to parties that did not participate in the organization+ Finally, we considered the effects of invoking the key opt-out clause, Article XXXV+ The number of invocations in our data set was small: only about 2,200 of 46+ Gowa and Kim 2005+ Notes: Each column comes from a separate ordinary least squares~OLS!…”