2020
DOI: 10.1080/15623599.2020.1757572
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An exact optimization approach to the principal-agent problem in infrastructure projects via PPPs

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Cited by 5 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…As for risks that are caused by information asymmetry among project participants, research in construction mainly deals with mitigation strategies. Thus, some of the main recognized strategies in recent research include the following: incentives for agents [10,[26][27][28][29][30]; control and monitoring of the agent [10]; optimization of rewards and agent performance [31]; building trust among the project participants [9]; risk sharing between principal and agent [32,33]; and the use of information technologies such as building information modeling (BIM) and blockchain [7,34,35]. However, the previous steps of risk management are not equally represented.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As for risks that are caused by information asymmetry among project participants, research in construction mainly deals with mitigation strategies. Thus, some of the main recognized strategies in recent research include the following: incentives for agents [10,[26][27][28][29][30]; control and monitoring of the agent [10]; optimization of rewards and agent performance [31]; building trust among the project participants [9]; risk sharing between principal and agent [32,33]; and the use of information technologies such as building information modeling (BIM) and blockchain [7,34,35]. However, the previous steps of risk management are not equally represented.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%