between the project owner, the contractor, and their project managers, as well as between the two project managers working for them. These are the key four parties in any construction project. In construction projects, the principal-agent problem is even more pronounced than is usually the case because of their short-term employment relationship. This problem is characterized by three issues concerning the relationship between the principal and the agent: adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold-up.Asymmetric information is common to all three. An exploratory survey was conducted in order to establish an understanding of the relative importance of the relationships between the key project parties in terms of the above communication risks. The respondents were project managers with considerable experience in the construction field. They agree that the main relationship in a construction project before the contract is signed is that between the project owner and contractor. However, they suggest that the main relationship after the contract is signed is that between the project owner's and contractor's project managers, both of whom are agents, which points to new and promising areas for further research. INTRODUCTIONGood communication between project participants is crucial for project suc� cess. Poor communication is one of the most common project risks (Ceric, 2003;Zerjav and Ceric, 2009 523Information asymmetry is the situa� tion in which one of the two parties is better informed than the other. One of the best known applications of infor� mation asymmetry in economics is the principal-agent problem (e.g., Jäger, 2008). Either buyers or sellers do not have reliable information about a par� ticular product or service. For example, a project owner as buyer is less well informed about the quality of a con� structed facility than a contractor as seller. Similarly, a contractor as buyer is better informed about the key char� acteristics of a construction projectsuch as time, cost, and quality-than an insurance company as seller of project insurance, for instance.The project owner and the contrac� tor form the key relationship in con� struction projects (Turner and Müller, 2004). Delegation of tasks establishes a principal�agent relationship between the project owner and contractor, where the principal (project owner) depends on the agent (contractor) to undertake a task on the principal's behalf (Müller and Turner, 2005). One can act on as� sumption that agents will try to maxi� mize their own benefit even when that may involve a higher damage to the client (Schieg, 2008). This problem is characterized by three issues of risk concerning the relationship between the principal and the agent: adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold�up. Briefly, adverse selection occurs when the principal does not have the exact qualifications of the agent before the contract is signed. In the case of moral hazard, the principal cannot be sure that the agent will fully act on the princi� pal's behalf after the contract is signed. ...

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All significant construction projects involve the project owner and the contractor, as well as their project managers. Following upon recent research into the multiple principal-agent problem, which was applied to the minimization of communication risk in construction projects, the focus here is on communication issues between the four project parties. Recent research has shown that the relationship between the project owner and the contractor is paramount for risk minimization before the contract between them is signed. However, the relationship between project managers is dominant for risk minimization after the contract is signed. To further explore risk minimization at this stage of the project, the Delphi method was employed. A panel of highly-experienced project managers working for both project owners and contractors was asked several rounds of questions in an attempt to arrive to a consensus concerning the most important relationships between project parties in terms of risk minimization after the contract is signed. The relationship between the two project managers tops the ranking, thus focusing further research. As they are both agents, and as there is no contract between them, this offers a fresh challenge for the principal-agent theory.

Communication risk is of crucial importance in construction projects. The situation in which one of the project parties is better informed than another is known as information asymmetry. This problem is addressed by the principal-agent theory. According to this theory, information asymmetries cause three problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and hold up. The focus here is on strategies for minimizing information asymmetries in the construction phase. A survey of project managers was conducted to establish an understanding of the relative importance of risk-minimization strategies established in the literature: bureaucratic control (contracts), information systems, incentives (bonuses), corporate culture, reputation, and trust. The multi-attribute utility theory was used to analyze the responses. According to the project managers who participated in the survey, trust is the most important strategy in the construction phase, followed by bureaucratic control (contracts) and information systems.