An evaluation of biosecurity compliance levels and assessment of associated risk factors for highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 infection of live-bird-markets, Nigeria and Egypt

Abstract

Live bird market (LBM) is integral component in the perpetuation of HPAI H5N1, while biosecurity is crucial and key to the prevention and control of infectious diseases. Biosecurity compliance level and risk factor assessments in 155LBMs was evaluated in Nigeria and Egypt through the administration of a 68-item biosecurity checklist, scored based on the modifications of previous qualitative data, and analysed for degree of compliance. LBMs were scored as "complied with a biosecurity item" if they had good-very good scores (4). All scores were coded and analysed using descriptive statistics and risk or protective factors were determined using univariable and multivariable logistic regression at p≤0.05. Trading of wild birds and other animal in the LBMs (Odd Ratio (OR)=34.90; p=0.01) and claims of hand disinfection after slaughter (OR=31.16; p=0.03) were significant risk factors while mandatory routine disinfection of markets (OR=0.13; p≤0.00), fencing and gates for live bird market (OR=0.02; p≤0.01) and hand washing after slaughter (OR=0.41; p≤0.05) were protective factors for and against the infection of Nigerian and Egyptian LBMs with the HPAI H5N1 virus. Almost all the LBMs complied poorly with most of the variables in the checklist (p≤0.05), but pathways to improved biosecurity in the LBMs existed. We concluded that the LBM operators play a critical role in the disruption of transmission of H5N1 virus infection through improved biosecurity and participatory epidemiology and multidisciplinary approach is needed.

Public health concerns of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 endemicity in Africa

“…This was further corroborated by the submissions of Fasanmi et al [21], at the LBMs in Egypt and Nigeria on biosecurity compliance and associated risk factors that could predispose to HPAI H5N1. Five factors (three protective and two risk factors) were compromised and could predispose to HPAI H5N1 outbreak significantly (Table-2) [21]. The display and trade of wild animals and birds in LBMs have been pointed out as another risk factor, because of the possibility of their exposure to low-grade influenza infection or may be reservoirs of infections, and there is possibility of shedding the virus and contaminating the LBMs environment [64,65].…”

“…Many of the outbreaks recorded in Nigeria and Egypt are market-based or have links with the LBMs [44,46,[61][62][63]. This was further corroborated by the submissions of Fasanmi et al [21], at the LBMs in Egypt and Nigeria on biosecurity compliance and associated risk factors that could predispose to HPAI H5N1. Five factors (three protective and two risk factors) were compromised and could predispose to HPAI H5N1 outbreak significantly (Table-2) [21].…”

“…Freeranged flocks have been identified to be more likely exposed to wild birds carrying the LPAI strains rather than commercial poultry flocks, thus providing these free-range birds with constant challenge and immunity maintenance [36]. It has been established that there are other media through which these viruses can be maintained, sustained, and perpetuated in nature, especially in Africa [17][18][19][20][21]. Analyses and comparative assessments of documented data of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in poultry over a period of 11 years (2006-2016) in Egypt and Nigeria show a progressive increase in the number of outbreaks in poultry; from 2006 to 2008 to the outbreaks in subsequent years [26,28].…”

“…Other potential sources suggested include illegal movement of infected poultry and products, multispecies (pig, duck, etc.) farming, and poor biosecurity compliance level in live bird markets (LBMs) [16][17][18][19][20][21].…”

“…: Identified risk factors associated with biosecurity compliance level in LBMs, Nigeria, and Egypt [21]. …”