An Enhanced Communication Protocol for Anonymity and Location Privacy in WSN

Abstract

Abstract-Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of many sensors working as hosts. These sensors can sense a phenomenon and represent it in a form of data. There are many applications for WSNs such as object tracking and monitoring where the objects need protection. Providing an efficient location privacy solution would be challenging to achieve due to the exposed nature of the WSN. The communication protocol needs to provide location privacy measured by anonymity, observability, capture-likelihood and safety period. We extend this work to allow for countermeasures against semi-global and global adversaries. We present a network model that is protected against a sophisticated passive and active attacks using local, semi-global, and global adversaries.

An Enhanced Communication Protocol for Location Privacy in WSN

“…Increasing the fake message will increase the power dissipation. Figure 5 shows that EEAC provides improved source safety period compared to EAC [4]. Figure 6 shows that EEAC also provides a stronger BS safety period compared to EAC [4].…”

“…It also could not handle multi-colluding adversaries and lacks a mechanism for time correlation attack. There is an extension for EAC presented in [4] which has reasonably addressed some of the issues of EAC. Most of the other solutions do not handle global or multi-colluding adversaries.…”

“…That means we need to use a one disposable pseudonym per a transmission. There are five kinds of transmissions that could happen in the WSN [4,16]: (i) multihop transmission between a SN and BS, (ii) transmission between two neighbor SNs, (iii) broadcast sent by a SN or the BS, (iv) acknowledgement, and (v) fake broadcast. The process starts by creating a pseudonym ID for each SN , and we call it for short (PID ) which is issued using the following expression:…”

“…Thus, we have replaced the ID with quintuple pseudonyms [4] to reference the SN during the communication. Figure 1 shows two sensors after they have exchanged the required pseudonyms.…”

“…It issues a message with such that APID ‖ OHPID ↔ ‖ → (APID ‖ PID ‖ ↔bs ( )) [4]. If ADV compromises multiple nodes along the path to the BS where it can decrypt the data at each SN to always read this signature (PID ‖ ↔bs ( )).…”