An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

Galichon, Alfred; Kominers, Scott Duke; Weber, Simon

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2535394

Cited by 17 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…the "who remains single" effect and the "who marries whom" effect respectively. Our main contribution is to show that, using a simple structural approach such as the one developed in Choo and Siow (2006) (CS from now on), equilibrium is fully characterized by a set of nonlinear equations (Galichon, Kominers, and Weber, 2018), that can be used to construct various reference measures of assortativeness taking the "who remains single" effect into account. More precisely, our approach distinguishes between "fixed joint utility" references that pin down the joint utility of couples but allow the (reservation) utilities of singles to vary across markets so that the distribution of singles corresponds to the observed one in that market; and "fixed surplus" references that pin down the full joint surplus of couples.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Marital Patterns and Income Inequality

Dupuy¹,

Weber

2018

SSRN Journal

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Marital Patterns and Income Inequality

Dupuy¹,

Weber

2018

SSRN Journal

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“…One is that marital sorting patterns -who marries whom -34 see Galichon et al (2016) for a recent contribution along these lines.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In estimating the age education profiles outside the model we are thus able to use policy induced information that we could not use if we estimated the entire model in one step. 17 Ideally we would need two instruments, or assume that education choices are ordered. Our estimates are almost identical if we assume that choices are ordered.…”

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confidence: 99%

The marriage market, labour supply and education choice

Chiappori¹,

Dias²,

Meghir³

2016

Working Paper Series

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We develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market.They then match based on the economic value of marriage and on preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage households (married or single) save, supply labor and consume private and public commodities under uncertainty. Marriage thus has the dual role of providing public goods and offering risk sharing. The model is estimated using the British HPS.Acknowledgements: This research has greatly benefited from discussions with

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“…With the exception of Chiappori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque (2012) and Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2014), previous models are typically restricted to either nontransferable or transferable utility. The objective in Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2014) is to generalize the Choo and Siow (2006) framework to models of imperfectly transferable utility.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The objective in Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2014) is to generalize the Choo and Siow (2006) framework to models of imperfectly transferable utility. Our framework is closer to that of Chiappori, Oreffice, and QuintanaDomeque (2012), who study a marriage market with positive assortative matching.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Latent indices in assortative matching models

Diamond

Agarwal

2017

Quantitative Economics

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A large class of two-sided matching models that include both transferable and non-transferable utility result in positive assortative matching along a latent index. Data from matching markets, however, may not exhibit perfect assortativity due to the presence of unobserved characteristics. This paper studies the identification and estimation of such models. We show that the distribution of the latent index is not identified when data from one-to-one matches are observed. Remarkably, the model is nonparametrically identified using data in a single large market when each agent on one side has at least two matched partners. The additional empirical content in many-to-one matches is demonstrated using simulations and stylized examples. We then derive asymptotic properties of a minimum distance estimator as the size of the market increases, allowing estimation using dependent data from a single large matching market. The nature of the dependence requires modification of existing empirical process techniques to obtain a limit theorem.

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An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility

Cited by 17 publications

References 72 publications

Marital Patterns and Income Inequality

Marital Patterns and Income Inequality

The marriage market, labour supply and education choice

Latent indices in assortative matching models

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