An empirical analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (1970) in Canada

Heyes, Anthony; Heyes, C.

doi:10.1016/s0928-7655(99)00013-5

Cited by 53 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The limited liability of nuclear reactor operators for accidents, for example, exhibits an implicit subsidy on nuclear energy. Heyes and Heyes (2000) estimate the magnitute of this implicit subsidy to be 0.01-3.58 ct/kWh for nuclear reactor operators in Canada. 15 Government grants, rebates, loans or guarantees for investments into nuclear power plants provide further implicit subsidies as well as non-internalized environmental costs for the safe storage Table 2: Consumption losses (in %) due to energy subsidies for non-learning backstop energy relative to the reference case with zero spillovers and subsidies.…”

Section: The Role Of Energy Subsidiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning or lock-in: Optimal technology policies to support mitigation

Kalkuhl

Edenhofer

Lessmann

2012

Resource and Energy Economics

173

141

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We investigate conditions that aggravate market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that "small" market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent energy technology over a dynamically more efficient competitor, given that the technologies are very good substitutes. Such a "lock-in" into an inferior technology causes significantly higher welfare losses than market failure alone, notably under ambitious mitigation targets. More than other innovative industries, energy markets are prone to these lock-ins because electricity from different technologies is an almost perfect substitute. To guide government intervention, we compare welfare-maximizing technology policies in addition to carbon pricing with regard to their efficiency, effectivity, and robustness. Technology quotas and feed-in-tariffs turn out to be only insignificantly less efficient than first-best subsidies and seem to be more robust against small perturbations. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: O380, Q400, Q540, Q550.

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Section: The Role Of Energy Subsidiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning or lock-in: Optimal technology policies to support mitigation

Kalkuhl

Edenhofer

Lessmann

2012

Resource and Energy Economics

173

141

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“…Risk assessment provides useful insights into insurability and the costs of a putative nuclear power accident. In the literature, limited liability as an implicit subsidy has been studied by Heyes and Heyes (2000) and, more generally, energy accidents and costs has been discussed by Sovacool (2008) and Felder (2009), among others. Probabilities of nuclear accidents have typically been estimated based on probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) or statistical analyses of historical data.…”

Section: Risk Of Accident and Perceptions Of Riskmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantifying the social costs of nuclear energy: Perceived risk of accident at nuclear power plants

Huhtala

Remes

2017

Energy Policy

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“…Nuclear energy technologies produce costs related to possible accidents and the final storage of nuclear wastes. These are typically not completely borne by operators, for example, due to relaxed liability rules (see, e.g., Heyes and Heyes, 2000). Moreover, there are also non-environmental externalities of non-renewable energy sources.…”

Section: Incomplete Internalization Of External Costs Of Non-renewablmentioning

confidence: 99%