An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada

Abstract

Both federal and provincial governments in Canada levy corporate taxes on businesses in their jurisdictions, which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax externalities within the federation. Using a simple model of interdependent tax choices, we estimate tax-setting functions for the federal government, Ontario, Quebec, and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces. We find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax interactions. Provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate, while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces. JEL Classification: H25, H7 Une analyse empirique de l'interaction fiscale entre gouvernements: le cas des impôts sur les revenus d'affaires au Canada. Au Canada, les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux collectent des impôts sur le revenu de sociétés sous leur jurisdiction. Voilà qui peut donner lieu à des effets externes horizontaux et verticaux à l'intérieur de la fédération. A l'aide d'un modèle de choix fiscaux interdépendants, les auteurs calibrent les fonctions d'imposition du gouvernement fédéral, des gouvernements du Québec et de l'Ontario, et d'une entité composée des huit autres provinces. On montre que les effets verticaux et horizontaux d'interaction fiscale sont significatifs. Les taux d'imposition des provinces réagissent négativement au taux d'imposition fédéral, mais certaines provinces accroissent leur taux d'imposition en réponse à des accroissements dans les taux d'imposition d'autres provinces.

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