An Efficient Signcryption Scheme with Key Privacy

Li, Chung Ki; Yang, Guomin; Wong, Duncan S.; Deng, Xin; Chow, Sherman S. M.

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-73408-6_6

Cited by 23 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…However, with the exception of a few random oracle model schemes [29][30][31][32], most signcryption schemes define separate key generation algorithms for senders and receivers, or essentially define a public/private keypair to consist of the concatenation of separate sender and receiver keypairs. Hence, a user playing the role of both sender and receiver will have to generate the equivalent of two keypairs.…”

Section: Signcryptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature, Revisited

Paterson

Schuldt

Stam

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We revisit the topic of joint security for combined public key schemes, wherein a single keypair is used for both encryption and signature primitives in a secure manner. While breaking the principle of key separation, such schemes have attractive properties and are sometimes used in practice. We give a general construction for a combined public key scheme having joint security that uses IBE as a component and that works in the standard model. We provide a more efficient direct construction, also in the standard model. We then consider the problem of how to build signcryption schemes from jointly secure combined public key schemes. We provide a construction that uses any such scheme to produce a triple of schemes -signature, encryption, and signcryption -that are jointly secure in an appropriate and strong security model.

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Section: Signcryptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Examples of signcryption schemes making use of a single keypair are known [29][30][31][32], but these are all in the random oracle model.…”

Section: Further Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature, Revisited

Paterson

Schuldt

Stam

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…We will review the signcryption syntax used in [14,15,24]. A signcryption scheme is formalized by five PPT algorithms SC = (Setup, KeyGen, SignCrypt, UnSignCrypt, Verify).…”

Section: Signcryption Syntaxmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[14,15,24], which requires that the challenge signcryption ciphertext C was not previously output by the signcryption oracle SC.S sk U (·, ·) on input (m, pk R ). However, as pointed out in [1] and similar to the signature setting in [13], the conventional (i.e.…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Relations among Privacy Notions for Signcryption and Key Invisible “Sign-then-Encrypt”

Yang

Manulis

et al. 2013

Information Security and Privacy

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Signcryption simultaneously offers authentication through unforgeability and confidentiality through indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks by combining the functionality of digital signatures and public-key encryption into a single operation. Libert and Quisquater (PKC 2004) extended this set of basic requirements with the notions of ciphertext anonymity (or key privacy) and key invisibility to protect the identities of signcryption users and were able to prove that key invisibility implies ciphertext anonymity by imposing certain conditions on the underlying signcryption scheme. This paper revisits the relationship amongst privacy notions for signcryption. We prove that key invisibility implies ciphertext anonymity without any additional restrictions. More surprisingly, we prove that key invisibility also implies indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks. This places key invisibility on the top of privacy hierarchy for public-key signcryption schemes.On the constructive side, we show that general "sign-then-encrypt" approach offers key invisibility if the underlying encryption scheme satisfies two existing security notions, indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and indistinguishability of keys against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. By this method we obtain the first key invisible signcryption construction in the standard model. Abstract. Signcryption simultaneously offers authentication through unforgeability and confidentiality through indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks by combining the functionality of digital signatures and public-key encryption into a single operation. Libert and Quisquater (PKC 2004) extended this set of basic requirements with the notions of ciphertext anonymity (or key privacy) and key invisibility to protect the identities of signcryption users and were able to prove that key invisibility implies ciphertext anonymity by imposing certain conditions on the underlying signcryption scheme. This paper revisits the relationship amongst privacy notions for signcryption. We prove that key invisibility implies ciphertext anonymity without any additional restrictions. More surprisingly, we prove that key invisibility also implies indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks. This places key invisibility on the top of privacy hierarchy for public-key signcryption schemes.On the constructive side, we show that general "sign-then-encrypt" approach offers key invisibility if the underlying encryption scheme satisfies two existing security notions, indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and indistinguishability of keys against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. By this method we obtain the first key invisible signcryption construction in the standard model.

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“…The privacy-protection requirement in VANETs can be satisfied by this property. The signcryption scheme in [28] is shown to satisfy message confidentiality, signature unforgeability, and ciphertext anonymity. In this paper, we employ this signcryption scheme to help a vehicle to safely receive secret member keys from RSUs.…”

Section: Signcryptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Scalable Robust Authentication Protocol for Secure Vehicular Communications

Zhang

Solanas

et al. 2010

IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol.

278

153

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Existing authentication protocols to secure vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) raise challenges such as certificate distribution and revocation, avoidance of computation and communication bottlenecks, and reduction of the strong reliance on tamper-proof devices. This paper efficiently copes with these challenges with a decentralized group-authentication protocol in the sense that the group is maintained by each roadside unit (RSU) rather than by a centralized authority, as in most existing protocols that are employing group signatures. In our proposal, we employ each RSU to maintain and manage an on-the-fly group within its communication range. Vehicles entering the group can anonymously broadcast vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) messages, which can be instantly verified by the vehicles in the same group (and neighboring groups). Later, if the message is found to be false, a third party can be invoked to disclose the identity of the message originator. Our protocol efficiently exploits the specific features of vehicular mobility, physical road limitations, and properly distributed RSUs. Our design leads to a robust VANET since, if some RSUs occasionally collapse, only the vehicles that are driving in those collapsed areas will be affected. Due to the numerous RSUs sharing the load to maintain the system, performance does not significantly degrade when more vehicles join the VANET; hence, the system is scalable. Disciplines Physical Sciences and Mathematics Publication DetailsZhang, L., Wu, Q., Solanas, A. & Domingo-Ferrer, J. (2010) Abstract-Existing authentication protocols to secure vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) raise challenges such as certificate distribution and revocation, avoidance of computation and communication bottlenecks, and reduction of the strong reliance on tamper-proof devices. This paper efficiently copes with these challenges with a decentralized group-authentication protocol in the sense that the group is maintained by each roadside unit (RSU) rather than by a centralized authority, as in most existing protocols that are employing group signatures. In our proposal, we employ each RSU to maintain and manage an on-the-fly group within its communication range. Vehicles entering the group can anonymously broadcast vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) messages, which can be instantly verified by the vehicles in the same group (and neighboring groups). Later, if the message is found to be false, a third party can be invoked to disclose the identity of the message originator. Our protocol efficiently exploits the specific features of vehicular mobility, physical road limitations, and properly distributed RSUs. Our design leads to a robust VANET since, if some RSUs occasionally collapse, only the vehicles that are driving in those collapsed areas will be affected. Due to the numerous RSUs sharing the load to maintain the system, performance does not significantly degrade when more vehicles join the VANET; hence, the system is scalable.Index Terms-Conditional privacy, information security, protocol design, v...

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An Efficient Signcryption Scheme with Key Privacy

Cited by 23 publications

References 22 publications

On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature, Revisited

On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature, Revisited

Relations among Privacy Notions for Signcryption and Key Invisible “Sign-then-Encrypt”

A Scalable Robust Authentication Protocol for Secure Vehicular Communications

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