An Efficient Method for Random Delay Generation in Embedded Software

Coron, Jean-Sébastien; Kizhvatov, Ilya

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_12

Cited by 100 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…The empirical value does ont fit the theoretical value very well, because more leakages are not included in the leakage interval I with the floating mean DFS than uniform DFS. Compared to results in [7] with DPA where the ratio is 45000/2500 = 18, the PPSA gives much better results.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 70%

“…So the standard deviation of the overall delay σ Σ is much less than σ 0 , which leads to efficiency degeneration. The second DFS employs more efficient floating mean method [7] with parameters a and b. The standard deviation of the overall delay with the floating mean method does not diminish with accumulation.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Re-synchronize the random clocks of DFS is very difficult in practice. More effective way to generate the random delays or frequency switchings is the floating-mean method [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Enhance Multi-bit Spectral Analysis on Hiding in Temporal Dimension

Luo

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Random delays and dynamic frequency switching are widely adopted in smartcards and embedded systems as temporal hiding countermeasures to side channel attack.Temporal hiding is regarded as efficient to enhance the security of cryptographic devices. However, spectral analysis with Fast Fourier Transform is a powerful method to defeat temporal hiding countermeasures. Spectral analysis shares the same merit with integration different power attack. Multi-bit spectral analysis is enhanced with partitioning power analysis, which is much more effective than the correlation power analysis in the spectral domain. Multi-bit spectral analysis effectively defeats temporal hiding countermeasure with floatingmean dynamic frequency switching countermeasure. It is suggested cryptographic devices should employ other countermeasures together with hiding to ensure side channel security.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 70%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Enhance Multi-bit Spectral Analysis on Hiding in Temporal Dimension

Luo

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…A common hardware defense against DPA is the introduction of RPIs [54]. Similarly, NOPs can be introduced as dummy operations in software to yield the same effect.…”

Section: Effective Countermeasuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

Krämer

2016

It - Information Technology

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Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich diese Dissertation selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe. Datum Für meine Eltern AbstractEver since the first side channel attacks and fault attacks on cryptographic devices were introduced in the mid-nineties, new possibilities of physical attacks have been consistently explored. The risk that these attacks pose is reduced by reacting to known attacks and by developing and implementing countermeasures against them. For physical attacks whose theory is known but which have not been conducted yet, however, the situation is different. Attacks whose physical realization is assumed to be very complex are taken less seriously. The trust that these attacks will not be realized due to their physical complexity means that no countermeasures are developed at all. This leads to unprotected devices once the assessment of the complexity turns out to be wrong.This thesis presents two practical physical attacks whose theory is known for several years. Since neither attack has previously been successfully implemented in practice, however, they were not considered a serious threat. Their physical attack complexity has been overestimated and the implied security threat has been underestimated. First, we introduce the photonic side channel, which offers not only temporal resolution, but also the highest possible spatial resolution. Due to the high cost of its first realization, it has not been taken seriously. We show both simple and differential photonic side channel analyses. Then, we present a fault attack against pairing-based cryptography. Due to the need for at least two independent precise faults in a single pairing computation, it has also not been taken seriously. We show how attackers can reveal the secret key of symmetric as well as asymmetric cryptographic algorithms based on these physical attacks. We present countermeasures on the software and the hardware level, which help to prevent these attacks in the future.Based on these two presented attacks, this thesis shows that the assessment of physical attack complexity is error-prone. Hence, cryptography should not rely on it. Cryptographic technologies have to be protected against all physical attacks, have they already been realized or not. The development of countermeasures does not require the successful execution of an attack but can already be carried out as soon as the principle of a side channel or a fault attack is understood.

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“…While the former is exemplified by mathematical and algorithmic augmentation, such as point or scalar blinding [6,Section 5] in Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), the latter represents a more diverse range of techniques. For platforms based on a generalpurpose processor, one example is skewing [26,7] or shuffling [15] the instruction stream: the countermeasure is applied automatically by the processor, irrespective of the purpose of said instruction stream (e.g., whether it represents an implementation of AES or DES). On more hardware-oriented platforms, use of secure logic styles [22,23] and (ab)use of pipelined logic [20] represent other examples: again the idea is that the approaches are viable no matter what the logic computes, with the only requirement being it is pipelined at all in the latter case.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On reconfigurable fabrics and generic side-channel countermeasures

Beat

Grabher

Page

et al. 2012

22nd International Conference on Field Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL)

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Abstract. The use of field programmable devices in security-critical applications is growing in popularity; in part, this can be attributed to their potential for balancing metrics such as efficiency and algorithm agility. However, in common with non-programmable alternatives, physical attack techniques such as fault and power analysis are a threat. We investigate a family of next-generation field programmable devices, specifically those based on the concept of time sharing, within this context: our results support the premise that extra, inherent flexibility in such devices can offer a range of possibilities for low-overhead, generic countermeasures against physical attack.

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An Efficient Method for Random Delay Generation in Embedded Software

Cited by 100 publications

References 6 publications

Enhance Multi-bit Spectral Analysis on Hiding in Temporal Dimension

Enhance Multi-bit Spectral Analysis on Hiding in Temporal Dimension

Why cryptography should not rely on physical attack complexity

On reconfigurable fabrics and generic side-channel countermeasures

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