An efficient conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme for Vehicle-To-Infrastructure communication in VANETs

LSWBVM: A Lightweight Security Without Using Batch Verification Method Scheme for a Vehicle Ad Hoc Network

“…In this scheme, the system's key and parameters are stored on the TPD of the RSU for secure communication. In 2020, Ali and Li [23] introduced an IDbased scheme using BP and a general one-way hash rather than a map-to-point hash for secure V2I communication. In their scheme, the messages are rapidly authenticated by an RSU.…”

“…In their scheme, the messages are rapidly authenticated by an RSU. The scheme in the first group [19], [20], [21], [22], [23] used BP and map-to-point hash function operations in the signing and verifying message during the broadcast process. These schemes support the batch verification method to authenticate large numbers of messages in high traffic density areas.…”

“…Bayat et al [22] in their message verification method use three operations of BP, operation of point multiplication in BP and map-to-point hash function. Ali and Li [23] use BP and point multiplication in BP operations in their message verification method.…”

“…In this section, we evaluate and compare the performance of the proposed LSWBVM scheme with Lie Zhang et al [19], Wang and Yao [20], Ali and Li [23], He et al [24], Lo and Tsai [25], Wu et al [26], Cui et al [31] and Zhong et al [32] in terms of computation and communication overheads.…”

“…The communication overheads are evaluated in this subsection. For a fair evaluation, to achieve the same level [19] 2Tmtp + 3T h 2Tmtp + 2T bp + 3T h 2T bp + (2n)Tmtp + (3n)T h BP Wang and Yao [20] 5T sm−bp + 2Tmtp nT sm−bp + 3T bp + 1Tmtp nT sm−bp + 3T bp + nTmtp BP Ali and Li [23] 3T sm−bp T bp + T sm−bp T bp + nT sm−bp BP He et al [24] 3T sm−ecc + 3T h 3T sm−ecc + 2T h (n + 2)T sm−ecc + (2n)T h ECC Lo and Tsai [25] 3T sm−ecc 3T sm−ecc + 2T pa−ecc (n + 2)T sm−ecc + (n + 1)T pa−ecc ECC Wu et al [26] 2T sm−ecc + 2T h 4T sm−ecc + 2T h + 2T pa−ecc (2n + 2)T sm−ecc + (2n)T h + (2n + 2)T pa−ecc ECC Cui et al [31] 2T sm−ecc 2T sm−ecc + T pa−ecc 2T sm−ecc + nT pa−ecc Filter Zhong et al [32] T h [23] 408 bytes 408 n bytes BP He et al [24] 144 bytes 144 n bytes ECC Lo and Tsai [25] 164 bytes 164 n bytes ECC Wu et al [26] 148 bytes 148 n bytes ECC Cui et al [31] 84 bytes 84 n bytes Filter Zhong et al [32] 24 bytes 24 n bytes Filter LSWBVM 100 bytes 100 n bytes ECC of security in pairing-based and ECC-based scheme, we use the parameters indicated in Table 3. The assumption in our analysis is the same for all of the schemes, while the output sizes of the timestamp and secure hash function are 4 bytes and 20 bytes, respectively.…”