The nuclear non-proliferation regime, despite being frequently criticised for an alleged lack of effectiveness, is in fact an amazing success story. The number of states which had conducted nuclear weapons activities in various stages but which have terminated them at one point surpasses the number of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs) by far. At the apex of its success, however, the regime is threatened by erosion from three different directions. A small number of rule-breakers and outsiders undermine its central objective: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The refusal of the official NWSs to fulfil their undertaking of nuclear disarmament violates the principle of justice enshrined in the treaty and thereby destroys its legitimacy, as does the perceived readiness by nuclear suppliers to impede the development of nuclear technology in developing countries. The Gordian Knot can presumably only be cut by a u-turn towards a world without nuclear weapons. This insight has meanwhile reached the mainstream security establishment of the United States, the president included. Whether this road will really be taken will determine the future of the regime-with far-reaching consequences for global security. The success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: beyond all expectations he nuclear non-proliferation regime, with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its core, can be called one of the most amazing international institutions. President Kennedy's famous nightmare in the 1960s, that within a decade 20 or even 30 Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs) might emerge, has not come true. Even today, the number of nuclear powers or states with active nuclear weapons programmes stays at 10. Five of them are recognised as legitimate nuclear weapons possessors by the NPT, coinciding with the permanent five members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are credited with nuclear weapon status or have proven it by testing their designs. Iran has been strongly suspected of conducting a determined nuclear weapons programme. In contrast, no fewer than 26 states, which once explored the idea of moving towards nuclear weapons, conducted feasibility studies, targeted weapon research or even development, or produced nuclear weapons (or inherited them after the decay of the Soviet Union), have renounced these activities or have been forced to do so. These countries make up almost the whole phalanx of middle powers. The miracle