An argument for metropolitan government in Australia

Tomlinson, R. A.

doi:10.1016/j.cities.2016.10.013

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Under the pre-existing disciplinary urban planning system everyone ‘knew their place’ and the ‘rules of the game’ (warranting critical analysis too—see Rogers, 2014; Searle and Bunker, 2010). The proponents and beneficiaries of this more flexible planning system were not, however, interested in the metropolitan scale or local constituencies as a site or reason for intervention and integration (Tomlinson, 2017). Furthermore, while transparent flows of information are key to urban planning, this new assemblage of actors and interests reshaped how information, consultation and review would thereupon unfold, first in Melbourne (Dovey, 2005) and then a decade later on another waterfront site in Sydney (Harris, 2018).…”

Section: Reconfiguring Democracy Through Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unsolicited urbanism: development monopolies, regulatory-technical fixes and planning-as-deal-making

Rogers

Gibson

2020

Environ Plan A

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article identifies the evolution of, and critiques, unsolicited urbanism—a project of city-shaping favouring powerful market actors but inconsistent with the neoliberal tenet of competition. Marked by predetermined outcomes, unsolicited urbanism legitimates secretive monopolies over specific sites and the normalization of planning-as-deal-making. Such features are not uncommon globally, as circuits of capital seek rent opportunities latent in urban land, and as market actors increasingly exercise power over development decision-making. But following casino-led mega-development in Melbourne (Southbank/Docklands) and Sydney (Barangaroo), Australia, unsolicited urbanism has coalesced as a clearly-identifiable project, inflected by relationships forged in the Asia-Pacific. The project, promoted by coalitions of developers, global capital, state government, and real estate, engineering and financing consultants, targets not just new sites for development, but the planning system itself. At its heart is a novel urban planning instrument, Unsolicited Proposals, that codifies and legitimizes bold and secretive bids for sites and assets over which governments and communities have not signalled intent or need for change. Unsolicited Proposal guidelines solicit premeditated, commercial-in-confidence bids to redevelop key urban assets without outside competition. Originating in two high-profile waterfront sites in Australia, the formalized Unsolicited Proposal planning process has spread elsewhere as a ‘fix’ to ‘unlock’ urban spaces for casino development, infrastructure financing and quasi-privatizations, with foreboding signs of its rapid mobility. The project of unsolicited urbanism connects money and power in new ways to reshape cities, and this analysis shows how a suite of regulatory-technical processes has been reconfigured to make this possible.

show abstract

Section: Reconfiguring Democracy Through Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unsolicited urbanism: development monopolies, regulatory-technical fixes and planning-as-deal-making

Rogers

Gibson

2020

Environ Plan A

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…CCR sit within a context in which State governments (within a federal system) hold constitutional authority over nearly all urban planning and development (Searle & Bunker, 2010). This constitutionally based role is nevertheless weakened by vertical fiscal imbalance in which the federal government has the main revenue-raising powers (Mangioni, 2018;Tomlinson, 2017), meaning that the states look to significant federal revenue assistance to carry out their constitutional responsibilities for city development and functioning. Complicating the issue further is the fact that multiple state-level departments are dedicated to metropolitan affairs such as regional planning, major transport infrastructure, water and sewerage, police, fire services, mass transit, and education.…”

Section: Fertile Ground: Pursuing 'Metropolitan' Governance In Australian Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Networked coalitions” as metropolitan governance: Lessons from the emergence of Australia’s Committees for Cities and Regions

Sigler

Mouat

Searle

et al. 2019

Journal of Urban Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The continuous rescaling of metropolitan governance has been a prominent feature of the neoliberal state. Metropolitan coalitions are one variant of governance in which disparate actors are brought together around a common agenda or platform. Drawing upon the example of Australia's 'Committees for Cities and Regions' (CCR), this paper applies urban governance theory to better understand the effectiveness of networked metropolitan governance coalitions. We find that such coalitions derive political legitimacy from the externalities produced by their network relations, which we theorize as a three-dimensional nexus of vertical (between levels of government), horizontal (between local actors), and 'diagonal' (with CCR counterparts) components. Although the CCR model is somewhat unique to Australia and New Zealand, it reflects similar networked and multi-scalar processes at work elsewhere, serving as a template for political landscapes in which in-built legacy political arrangements largely preclude metropolitan-scale issues from being addressed.

show abstract

“…As a result, political jurisdictions no longer match the patterns of urban material flows and socio-economic demands making planning problems that are best dealt with at a regional scale challenging (Dedekorkut-Howes 2014). Despite moves towards conglomeration most metropolitan areas in industrialised countries, including Australia, consist of numerous local governments (Ahrend, Gamper, and Schumann 2014;Tomlinson 2017;Davidson and Gleeson 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, there has been an increase in governance arrangements that operate at the metropolitan scale across the globe (Heinelt and Kubler 2005;Homsy and Warner 2015;Savitch and Adhikari 2017). At one extreme, in rare instances metropolitan government amalgamates the many small local governments into a single large entity covering the metropolitan area (Lefèvre 1998;Tomlinson 2017). More common is the creation of organisations designed to improve coordination of policies across the metropolitan area, termed metropolitan governance or regionalism (Gleeson, Darbas, and Lawson 2004;Ahrend, Gamper, and Schumann 2014;Homsy and Warner 2015;Savitch and Adhikari 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Australia, where there are three tiers of government -Federal, State, and Local -, there has been an increasing focus on regional-scale coordination and cooperation especially around major urban centres (Abbott 2010) and recently calls for metropolitan governance are growing (Gleeson, Darbas, and Lawson 2004;Abbott 2010;Burton 2017;Tomlinson 2017;Steele 2019). At the city scale, with a single large local council Brisbane is often held as an example of metropolitan government.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Responding to change: lessons from water management for metropolitan governance

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Metropolitan governance is back on the agenda in Australia as cities continue to grow and dominate the economy as well as their surrounding regions. In some sectors, however, metropolitan governance is not new. Water resources have long been governed at a metropolitan scale, even if it has not been explicitly called so. This paper uses the example of water governance in South East Queensland (SEQ) to draw lessons for metropolitan-scale governance across Australia. It discusses why and how water governance in SEQ has become increasingly 'metropolitan', the advantages of this approach, and why it has also proved problematic. In particular, the findings of the research highlight how the approach in SEQ has been fragmented. The paper concludes by outlining recommendations for improving coordination and participation at the metropolitan scale.

show abstract

An argument for metropolitan government in Australia

Cited by 15 publications

References 9 publications

Unsolicited urbanism: development monopolies, regulatory-technical fixes and planning-as-deal-making

Unsolicited urbanism: development monopolies, regulatory-technical fixes and planning-as-deal-making

“Networked coalitions” as metropolitan governance: Lessons from the emergence of Australia’s Committees for Cities and Regions

Responding to change: lessons from water management for metropolitan governance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About