2020
DOI: 10.1177/0308518x20952421 View full text |Buy / Rent full text
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Abstract: This article identifies the evolution of, and critiques, unsolicited urbanism—a project of city-shaping favouring powerful market actors but inconsistent with the neoliberal tenet of competition. Marked by predetermined outcomes, unsolicited urbanism legitimates secretive monopolies over specific sites and the normalization of planning-as-deal-making. Such features are not uncommon globally, as circuits of capital seek rent opportunities latent in urban land, and as market actors increasingly exercise power ov… Show more

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“…To achieve this, the government might take on risks and/or transfer existing revenue streams in order to make projects financially attractive. These negotiations are often done behind closed doors, similar to what Rogers and Gibson call planning as deal making (Rogers and Gibson, 2020). And third, formal planning follows this logic.…”
Section: Ppps and Neoliberal Urban Governancementioning
“…To understand why, we should look beyond the obvious problems for the public good, and into what the mechanism offers to interested parties. USPs can be seen as the formalization of a broader move toward "unsolicited urbanism," a mode of planning as deal making that allows private investors, consultants, and public officials to make arrangements that bypass standard planning regulations (Rogers and Gibson, 2020). Furthermore, these deals are done behind closed doors, as confidentiality clauses are common because the information produced by the private party in the planning process remains private (Siemiatycki, 2007).…”
Section: Ppps and Neoliberal Urban Governancementioning
“…2 Despite long-standing critique of neoliberalism 3 within academic literature (Beauregard, 1989), planning scholarship has been slow to notice privatisation, or to consider the implications of the profit-motive for a practice traditionally rooted in the public sector (Dear, 1989). This leaves an important set of under-examined intersections, between drives towards more market-driven forms of urban development (Peck et al, 2013; Rogers and Gibson, 2020), organisational and managerial state restructuring (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Peck, 2001) and the reworking of public values (Bozeman, 2007) through the extension of fiscal discipline in local government (Beswick and Penny, 2017). Addressing these here, we seek to illustrate how introducing commercial logics in planning connects to wider debates on neoliberalisation within urban studies as ‘a more deeply rooted and creatively destructive process … that is mutating the landscapes of both urban development and urban governance’ (Peck et al, 2013: 1092).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
“…Recent contributions have begun to address this gap, raising critical questions about the impacts of privatisation on planning’s democratic accountability and (long-contested) claims to operate in the public interest (Parker et al, 2018; Raco, 2018; Rogers and Gibson, 2020). This article furthers these understandings, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork that provided in-depth insight into the changing nature of contemporary practice in England.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
“…These more subtle interrogations suggest that any assessment of property price inflation should situate credit liberalization as just one element within a policy configuration, that is, as one component within a complex institutional formation. The authors in this Special Issue contribute to this project by analyzing house price inflation in relation to fiscal policy (Ryan-Collins, 2021); shifting methods of urban planning (Weber, 2021); neoliberal narratives focused on supply shortages (Phibbs and Gurran, 2021); the ways in which new elite alliances have gained hold of urban policy and development (Rogers and Gibson, 2021); cultures and policies of tenure (Christophers, 2021); and the growth of specific constituencies that tend to lock in patterns of policy making (Adkins et al, 2021).…”
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