2009
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9506-z
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An agent-based conception of models and scientific representation

Abstract: I argue for an intentional conception of representation in science that requires bringing scientific agents and their intentions into the picture. So the formula is: Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world, W; (4) for some purpose, P. This conception legitimates using similarity as the basic relationship between models and the world. Moreover, since just about anything can be used to represent anything else, there can be no unified ontology of models. This whole approach is… Show more

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Cited by 215 publications
(130 citation statements)
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References 17 publications
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“…On the contrary, keys can be highly conventional. This sharply distinguishes our account from accounts like Giere's (2004Giere's ( , 2010) and Weisberg's (2012Weisberg's ( , 2013) who take similarity (or at least purported similarity), in the relevant respects to the appropriate degrees, to be the relation between models and their targets. As discussed above, although keys can be the identity map, or a mapping between similar properties, this is not built into the account, and in this sense our account is more general that those based on the notion of similarity.…”
Section: Imputation and Keysmentioning
confidence: 89%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…On the contrary, keys can be highly conventional. This sharply distinguishes our account from accounts like Giere's (2004Giere's ( , 2010) and Weisberg's (2012Weisberg's ( , 2013) who take similarity (or at least purported similarity), in the relevant respects to the appropriate degrees, to be the relation between models and their targets. As discussed above, although keys can be the identity map, or a mapping between similar properties, this is not built into the account, and in this sense our account is more general that those based on the notion of similarity.…”
Section: Imputation and Keysmentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Frigg (2010a, b) and Godfrey-Smith (2006) provide outlines of what such an account could look like. 18 Developing the details of such an account and integrating it with the DEKI account of representation is a project for future research.…”
Section: Envoimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…De hecho, Chamizo (2013) afirma que una de las principales actividades de los científicos es evaluar qué modelos se ajustan mejor a las evidencias disponibles, buscando la explicación más plausible para un cierto fenómeno (Chamizo, 2013;Driver, Newton y Osborne, 2000). A pesar de las innumerables definiciones de modelos científicos y de la diversidad de tipos de modelos científicos existentes, podemos decir, en términos globales, que un modelo científico es una representación de determinados aspectos del mundo, de acuerdo con un objetivo específico (Chamizo, 2010;Chamizo, 2013;Giere, 2010). Así, el modelo es una representación intencional y simplificada, ya que resulta de la intención, interpretación y conocimiento del científico.…”
Section: Los Modelos Científicosunclassified
“…Así, el modelo es una representación intencional y simplificada, ya que resulta de la intención, interpretación y conocimiento del científico. Teniendo en consideración la concepción intencional de la representación científica de Giere (2010), se hace evidente que existan modelos múltiples para estudiar diferentes aspectos del mismo sistema, ya que el científico selecciona los aspectos que pretende estudiar. Del mismo modo, también pueden existir diferentes modelos para estudiar el mismo aspecto del mundo, porque los científicos pueden tener ideas diferentes y pueden socorrerse de recursos distintos para construirlos (Oh y Oh, 2011).…”
Section: Los Modelos Científicosunclassified
“…French & Ladyman, 1999)-that is precisely what the recent practice-oriented approaches to modeling and representation have sought to avoid (e.g. Giere, 2010;Knuuttila, 2005;Mäki, 2009;Suárez, 2010). It seems to us that the goal of highlighting the role of analogies in science is to make room for the constructive and imaginative moment of scientific reasoning; the different semantic-cum-structuralist accounts fixated on the structural relationships between the source and target systems fail to pay attention to this.…”
Section: ) Transient and Heterogeneous Nature Of Analogical Reasoningmentioning
confidence: 99%