An Action Assembly Perspective on Social Skill

Abstract

The aims of this article are to arguefor an alternative approach to theorizing about social skill and to apply a model developed within this alternative perspective in identifying the mechanisms that give rise to various performance deficits. Theorizing about social skill is currently dominated by models that emphasize the role of knowledge and motivation in skilled behavior. Despite this, it should be clear that people may possess adequate knowledge and motivation and still fail to perform skillfully. For this reason, it is desirable to examine the mechanisms of behavioral production that give rise to nonoptimal behavior even when knowledge and motivation are sufficient. Toward this end, a particular model of the behavioral-production system, action assembly theory, is presented, and its implications for understanding performance deficits explored.It seems an unavoidable and frustrating fact of our social lives that on many occasions we produce messages only, on further reflection, to succeed in formulating a response that would have been more skilled or effective than the message we actually gave. Who among us hasn't come up with an original and incisive response to a critic on a conference panel long after the last group of weary conventioneers has abandoned the hotel lobby for the evening? It seems that we often struggle to comfort a friend, graciously accept a compliment, handle conflict with skill, or write just the right sentence, and yet later figure out a way to have done it "better."One of our aims here is to argue that this common phenomenon suggests the need for a reorientation in our thinking about social skill. Instances in which we succeed in formulating superior messages after the fact indicate that while we may possess appropriate knowledge and motivation to perform well, these factors do not insure skilled behavior. Our point, however, is not simply that there are factors in addition to knowledge and motivation that are relevant to social skill, but instead, that a style of theorizing, distinct from what currently dominates approaches to social performance, is required.The broad-based and sustained nature of research on social skill and competence has given rise to a large number of explanatory and organizational frameworks reflecting an array of specific behavioral and/or cognitive foci, root metaphors, and assumptive foundations (see Curran

“Here I go again”: An examination of repetitive behaviors during interpersonal conflicts

“…We are especially grateful to Dr. Lenny Martin for his insights during this project, and to Dr. Craig Allen Smith for his extensive help in editing the manuscript. 1 We are in agreement with Greene and Geddes' (1993) suggestion that theories of social skill should focus on the "mechanisms of output production" to give accounts of non-optimality. Greene and Geddes point out that the humans are rational, but imperfecdy so (i.e., we can fail to act in accord with our knowledge and motivations).…”

“…The available evidence suggests that RNO behaviors may be related to both communication goals and negative arousal emerging during conflict interactions. Negative arousal is a useful starting point for this investigation because negative drive states can be detrimental to the production of competent behaviors (Greene & Geddes, 1993).' Additionally, some research suggests that arousal and communicator goals are causally linked (Mclntosh & Martin, 1992;Roseman, 1979).…”

What sort of terms ought theories of human action incorporate?

“…The frequency of performance failures such as lexical-transposition errors, tip-of-the-tongue phenomena, phoneme intrusions, and so forth (see Brown & McNeill, 1966;Harley, 1984;MacKay, 1980;Motley, Baars, & Camden, 1983) makes clear that people may possess requisite knowledge and/or ability, and be sufficiently motivated, and yet still not perform in an adequate fashion. Further, it is significant that performance failures of this sort are not limited to lower-level features of behavior (see Greene & Geddes, 1993;Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985;Norman, 1981;Reason, 1979;Singley & Anderson, 1989). Thus, a person may posses information about effective conflict-management techniques, say, and be motivated to behave in an effective and appropriate manner, and yet still fail to employ those skills (see Bagarozzi, 1985;Bellack, Hersen, & Turner, 1978).…”

“…The conception of the tripartite system advanced here draws upon elements of action assembly theory (AAT) (see Greene, 1984bGreene, , 1989Greene & Geddes, 1988, 1993. Although AAT was not developed with an eye toward the tripartite system, it does seek to provide an account of the generative mechanisms underlying message production.…”

Mindfulness, mindlessness and communication instruction

“…Anxious speakers will allocate more cognitive resources to worrying over their forthcoming speech performance, leaving less devoted to preparation and rehearsal (Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). From this perspective the procedural memories associated with anxiety conditioning will disrupt the assembly of competent social skills (Greene & Geddes, 1993).…”